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Executive summary 
This is the fourth report of the revised INFORM’s concept and methodology. INFORM is a 
composite indicator that identifies countries at risk of humanitarian crisis and disaster 
that would overwhelm national response capacity. The INFORM index supports a 
proactive crisis and disaster management framework. The INFORM initiative began in 
2012 as a convergence of interests of UN agencies, donors, NGOs and research 
institutions to establish a common evidence base for global humanitarian risk analysis. 
The INFORM model is based on risk concepts published in scientific literature and 
envisages three dimensions of risk: Hazards & exposure, Vulnerability, and Lack of 
coping capacity. The INFORM model is split into different levels to provide a quick 
overview of the underlying factors leading to humanitarian risk and builds up the picture 
of risk by 54 core indicators. 
Any changes in the INFORM methodology are always applied to at least the five previous 
years of data to preserve the consistency of the trend analysis. 
Policy context 
The Index for Risk Management INFORM is a composite indicator developed by JRC as a 
tool for understanding the risk of humanitarian crisis and disasters. INFORM provides the 
scientific support to the following EU policy initiatives: 
• Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament — EU strategy for supporting disaster risk reduction in developing 
countries. [1] 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian 
aid. [2] 
• Council Conclusions of 30 November 2009 on a Community framework on 
disaster prevention within the EU. [3] 
• Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions — A Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-
made disasters. [4] 
• Commission Staff working Paper of 21 October 2010 — Risk Assessment and 
Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management. [5] 
• Communication from the Commission of 22 November 2010 — The EU Internal 
Security Strategy in Action: five steps towards a more secure Europe, 
CoM(2010)673. [6] 
• TFEU (2012), C 326, 26.10.2012, Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union (consolidated version 2012). [7] 
• Communication from the Commission of 16 April 2013 — An EU Strategy on 
adaptation to climate change, CoM(2013) 216 final. [8] 
• Regulation (EU) No 1290/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 December 2013 laying down the rules for participation and dissemination 
in ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 
(2014-2020)’ and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1906/2006. [9] 
• Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism Text with EEA 
relevance. [10] 
• Communication from the Commission of 8 April 2014 — The post 2015 Hyogo 
Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience. [11] 
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• Council conclusions on the post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing 
risks to achieve resilience (9884/14, May 2014). [12] 
• Council conclusions on Risk Management Capability — Adoption (June 2014, 
13375/14 and June 2014). [13] 
• Communication from the Commission of 2 September 2015 — Towards the 
World Humanitarian Summit: A global partnership for principled and effective 
humanitarian action. [14] 
INFORM is a joint initiative of the European Commission and the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee Task Team (IASC) for Preparedness and Resilience, in partnership with many 
UN Agencies, donors, NGOs, and Member States. INFORM is also intended to support 
global policy processes, including: 
• The Sendai framework for development and disaster risk reduction adopted in 
March 2016; 
• The 17th Sustainable Development Goals adopted in UN Summit in September 
2015; 
• The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit; 
• The 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction; 
• The resilience ‘agenda’, around which many organisations are focusing their 
humanitarian and development work. 
Key conclusions 
Most humanitarian crises can be predicted to some extent, and while they cannot always 
be prevented, the suffering they cause can often be greatly reduced. Understanding crisis 
risk — the probability of a crisis occurring and its likely impact — is a fundamental step in 
reducing and managing the risk. Risk analysis is used to identify the people and places 
most at risk and, therefore, reduce and manage the threat. When all those involved in 
crisis prevention, preparedness and response — including governments, humanitarian 
and development agencies and donors — have a common understanding of risk, they can 
work more effectively together. 
INFORM has been developed to improve the common evidence basis for risk analysis so 
all governments, development agencies, disaster risk reduction actors and organisations 
can work together. INFORM is the first global, open-source, continuously updated, 
transparent and reliable tool for understanding risk of humanitarian crises and disasters. 
It covers 191 countries. All the results and data used are freely available and the INFORM 
partnership includes many data source organisations. Methodology is completely 
transparent and is based on scientific concepts and methods. 
The INFORM index supports a proactive crisis and disaster management framework. It 
will be helpful for an objective allocation of resources for disaster management as well as 
for coordinated actions focused on anticipating, mitigating, and preparing for 
humanitarian emergencies. Many organisations are already using INFORM. 
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Main findings 
 
Figure 1: INFORM summarises the multitude 
of factors contributing to the risk for 
humanitarian crises and disasters into a single 
index. 
 
Figure 2: INFORM 2017 Risk index map 
shows risk of humanitarian crises and 
disaster across the globe. 
As a composite indicator, INFORM: 
• ranks countries according to the likelihood of needed international assistance 
in the near future; 
• creates a risk profile for every country which shows the level of the individual 
components of risk; 
• allows for trend analysis because the results of INFORM are available for at 
least 5 consecutive years. 
Related and future JRC work 
The JRC is actively involved in the continuous development of INFORM, which includes 
methodological improvements for more accurate risk assessment as well as introduction 
of new and better (more complete, representative and/or accurate) data when it 
becomes available. The main model is expected to remain stable to guarantee the 
comparability over the years and trend analysis. INFORM can also be used to measure 
risk at the sub-national level. The JRC and INFORM partners are working with regional 
and national counterparts to develop region- and country-specific versions of INFORM. 
Quick guide 
The Index for Risk Management — INFORM — is a way to understand and measure the 
risk of a humanitarian crisis. INFORM is a composite indicator, developed by the JRC and 
endorsed by INFORM partners, combining 54 indicators into three dimensions of risk: 
Hazards (events that could occur) and exposure to them, Vulnerability (the susceptibility 
of communities to those hazards) and the Lack of coping capacity (lack of resources that 
can alleviate the impact). The index’s results are published twice a year. They give an 
overall risk score out of 10 for each country, and for each of the dimensions, categories, 
and components of risk (see Figure 1). The purpose of INFORM is to provide an open, 
transparent, consensus-based methodology for analysing crisis risk at global, regional or 
national level. 
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1 Introduction 
2015 was a crucial year for disaster risk management. Three international frameworks of 
the post-2015 development agenda were signed with clear targets to reduce disasters 
and humanitarian suffering for the world’s population. In the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (1), adopted in March 2015, national governments engage 
themselves to prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk by reducing hazard exposure 
and vulnerability and increase preparedness and resilience. In September 2015, 17 
Sustainable Development Goals were adopted in a UN Summit and disaster risk is 
prominent in three of them: end poverty, build resilient cities, and combat climate 
change. In December, the UN Framework on Climate Change aims to achieve a legally 
binding agreement in the Paris Climate Conference. All frameworks emphasise the role of 
science and objective data to monitor progress in risk reduction, and INFORM has been 
widely promoted at the world conferences. 
In 2016, the first World Humanitarian Summit (2) set a new agenda to keep humanitarian 
action fit for the future. Humanitarian and development stakeholders increasingly 
recognise the need to transition from a reactive humanitarian crisis response model to a 
proactive crisis and disaster management framework. Such a framework must be built on 
a sound understanding of the drivers of humanitarian risk so that actors can work from a 
common understanding of priorities in order to target their resources in a coordinated 
and effective manner. This has been the guiding principle in the development of INFORM. 
INFORM is a partnership of a group of UN agencies, donors, NGOs and research 
institutions to develop a comprehensive and flexible, widely accepted, open and 
continuously updated, transparent and evidence-based multi-hazard humanitarian risk 
index with global coverage and regional/subnational scale and seasonal variation. The 
group is engaged in incorporating the risk index in internal decision-making processes 
and to demonstrate the added value of doing so to other interested organisations. Some 
examples are the following: 
• INFORM is successfully integrated in the internal processes of the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian and Civil Protection Office (ECHO). After a 
transition period, ECHO adopted fully the INFORM index (3) and is promoting 
its use with partners. 
• OCHA, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, adopted the 
INFORM index. INFORM is used to support decisions and prioritisation of 
OCHA’s preparedness activities as well as being one of the inputs into the 
process for deciding on funding allocation from pooled funds. 
• The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is transitioning its 
risk assessment to incorporate INFORM, while it is also promoting INFORM-
inspired thematic risk assessment pilots (e.g. during the Ebola crisis). 
• The World Food Programme (WFP) is using INFORM to support decisions on 
prioritisation of emergency preparedness and resilience activities and as a 
basis for deciding which countries should be the focus for further research and 
analysis for the purpose of early warning. 
• Unicef has customised INFORM based on consultations with regional 
emergency advisors to be used to prioritise technical and financial support as 
well as to assign lighter emergency preparedness standards to low-risk 
countries. 
• The US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) are promoting the use of INFORM-inspired risk analyses to inform 
annual strategy and budget decision-making. 
                                           
(1)  http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf 
(2)  https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org 
(3)  http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en 
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During 2016, INFORM Subnational continues to be rolled out by local lead organisations, 
with projects underway in Latin America and the Caribbean, southern Africa and central 
Asia regions, as well as in Guatemala, Honduras and Jordan. From 2017, INFORM 
partners will be further supporting INFORM Subnational development through an 
‘Acceleration Programme’, which will result in improved guidance, training for INFORM 
Subnational developers and users, as well as directly supporting five additional national 
projects. 
INFORM is a composite indicator designed to support decisions about prevention, 
preparedness and response. The INFORM initiative started in a workshop in October 2012 
organised at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC). The JRC is 
the main scientific partner in the INFORM process, and has led the bottom-up process of 
building a consensus-based new methodology, taking into account the requirements of 
participating institutions as well as limitations of data availability. INFORM has annual 
partner conferences where strategic developments are discussed, and frequent 
teleconferences of the core group and/or thematic groups to discuss implementation of 
methodological improvements and changes. 
Over the last year, some improvements have been implemented into the INFORM 
methodology: 
• The data layer used to calculate the exposure to natural hazard components 
has been updated from LandScan© to the new open-source Global Human 
Settlements Layer GHSL Population Grid produced by the European 
Commission JRC. The GHSL Population Grid fits all of INFORM’s requirements, 
being global coverage, open source, transparent methodology and high 
resolution for the subnational models. 
• The enhanced spatial resolution of the GHSL Global Population Grid compared 
to the previous exposure layer, allowed the improvement of the estimation of 
the population exposed to coastal hazards like Tsunami, Cyclon wind and 
Surge. Furthermore, the processing of the Storm surge hazard data was 
revised. 
• The ‘Global Conflict Risk Index’, which is used in the ‘Projected Conflict 
Risk’ component of INFORM, has been significantly improved. 
• ‘Maternal mortality ratio’ has been added as a new indicator in the ‘Access 
to health system' component of the ‘Lack of coping capacity’ dimension. 
• In addition, a new measure of reliability has been added, which is now 
displayed for every country. This has been introduced to increase transparency 
in the quality (completeness, representativeness, recentness and/or accuracy) 
of data used to calculate INFORM’s score, while still ensuring that as many 
countries as possible are included. It is presented as a Lack of Reliability 
Index on a scale from 0-10 and takes into account missing data, out-of-date 
data, and conflict status. Countries with lower Lack of Reliability Index scores 
have risk scores that are based on data that are more reliable. 
The scope of this publication is to describe the methodology of the global INFORM index 
in detail. It can be considered as the third version of the methodology, greatly improved 
by feedback of real use by participating organisations, suggestions of new partners, and 
availability of new science and data. INFORM will keep evolving when new science and 
data becomes available, but the main concepts, dimensions and indicators are expected 
to remain stable to allow for comparability over the years and trends analysis. 
For more information and updated versions of this document, please refer to the INFORM 
website: http://www.inform-index.org 
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2 Key concepts of the INFORM index 
2.1 Objective of INFORM 
The INFORM index is a way to simplify a lot of information about crisis risk so it can be 
easily used for decision-making. It is a composite indicator that identifies ‘countries at 
risk from humanitarian emergencies and disasters that could overwhelm current national 
response capacity, and therefore lead to a need for international assistance’. 
INFORM’s methodology is designed to answer several questions. 
● Which countries are at risk of crisis that will require humanitarian assistance in 
response to disasters? 
● What are the underlying factors that could lead to crisis? 
● How does the risk change with time? 
The objective of INFORM is to answer those questions with a relatively simple framework 
for quantifying humanitarian crisis risk, which is based on risk concepts published in 
scientific literature. 
2.2 Risk concept 
In scientific literature there are many different views on how to systematically address 
disaster risk reflected in various analytical concepts and models of diverse complexity 
[1]. Those which are the most relevant to INFORM methodology, were presented already 
in [16], [17], [18]. They range from the basic conceptual framework of disaster risk 
community to identifying risk as the interaction of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and 
capacity measures, [19], [20], to a complex framework for studying the interface and 
reciprocal interactions that link humans to nature known as coupled human-environment 
system [21]. Among these the features of the pressure and release model (PAR model) 
[22] and Cardona’s holistic perspective of vulnerability and risk [23] have had the 
strongest influence on development of the INFORM model. PAR model understands the 
disaster as the interaction between socio-economic pressures as the underlying factors of 
vulnerability and physical exposure to the hazardous event. While Cardona’s 
understanding of vulnerability takes into account three aspects, that of physical exposure 
and physical vulnerability, the fragility of the socio-economic system (prevalent aspects 
of individual self-protection) and lack of resilience to cope and recover (aspect of 
collective self-protection). Such perception of the vulnerability has been adopted also in 
the 2009 UNISDR terminology [24]. 
Essentially, INFORM risk concept envisages three dimensions of risk: 
● Hazards & exposure (events that could occur and exposure to them); 
● Vulnerability (the susceptibility of communities to those hazards); 
● Lack of coping capacity (lack of resources available that can alleviate the 
impact). 
They are conceptualised in a counterbalancing relationship: the risk of what (natural and 
human hazard), and the risk to what (population). 
The INFORM model balances two major forces (Figure 3) as identified in PAR model: the 
hazard & exposure dimension on one side, and the vulnerability and the lack of coping 
capacity dimensions on the other side. Hazard-dependent factors are treated in the 
hazard & exposure dimension, while hazard-independent factors are divided among two 
dimensions: the vulnerability dimension that considers the strength of the individuals and 
households relative to a crisis situation, and the lack of coping capacity dimension that 
considers factors of institutional strength. 
The INFORM risk concept considers all three aspects of Cardona’s vulnerability. The 
aspects of physical exposure and physical vulnerability are integrated in the hazard & 
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exposure dimension, the aspect of fragility of the socio-economic system becomes 
INFORM’s vulnerability dimension while lack of resilience to cope and recover is treated 
under the lack of coping capacity dimension. The split of vulnerability in three 
components is particularly useful for tracking the results of disaster reduction strategies 
over time. Disaster risk reduction activities are often localised and address particular 
community-level vulnerabilities and institutional capacities. 
 
Figure 3: The risk concept of INFORM 
 
The INFORM score is calculated with a multiplicative equation where each of the 
dimensions is treated equally: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑&𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
1
3 × 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1
3 × 𝐿𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
1
3 Equation 1 
In this form INFORM’s score is more susceptible to Vulnerability and Lack of coping 
capacity, the internal forces of risk that can be most influenced by the DRR activities. 
Equation 1 resembles the risk equation, where all the factors come with the probabilistic 
notion. However, composite indicator methodology can afford to use proxies whenever 
the probabilistic presentation of the concept’s dimension is not available. 
For the sake of more straightforward communication, higher values in INFORM refer to 
worse conditions. High values in Vulnerability and Lack of coping capacity lead to worse 
outcomes in the presence of high values of Hazard & exposure. The risk equals zero if 
one of the three dimensions is zero. Theoretically, in case of tropical cyclones there is no 
risk if there is no likelihood of a tropical cyclone occurring or/and the hazard zone is not 
populated or/and if the population is not vulnerable (e.g. all people have a high level of 
education and live in a high level of health and livelihood condition plus they can afford 
houses built to a high level of wind security) or/and if the resilience of the country to 
cope and recover is ideal. In practice, only some indicators in the Hazard & exposure can 
be zero, when the hazard is truly zero. 
2.3 INFORM model 
INFORM model is a multilayer structure (Table 1) that builds up a score of risk by 
bringing together 54 (4) different indicators. They measure three dimensions of INFORM 
risk concept. 
                                           
(4) In the INFORM 2017 release a new indicator, the Maternal mortality rate, was introduced. 
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Each dimension is made up from two risk categories. Categories cannot be fully 
captured by an individual indicator. They have been chosen to reflect the interest of 
users of INFORM. For example, UNISDR may follow the institutional category index in the 
coping capacity dimension while Unicef and WFP may be more interested in the category 
of vulnerable groups in the vulnerability dimension. Underlying factors that contribute to 
the ranking results can be sought down through the levels depending on how narrowly 
the users intend to target their interventions. 
Table 1. INFORM model 
Risk INFORM 
Dimensions Hazard & exposure Vulnerability Lack of coping capacity 
Categories Natural Human 
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Categories comprise a number of components. Components are carefully chosen sets of 
indicators that capture a specific topic of the component, for example earthquake, 
inequality, or governance. The components of INFORM have been chosen to fulfil the 
‘3 Rs’ criteria: relevant, representative, and robust. 
Indicators are the individual datasets that make up INFORM, for example the number of 
people exposed to earthquake of a certain magnitude, the Gender Inequality Index or 
government effectiveness. Indicators may be composite indices themselves. The source 
data of indicator is pre-processed (Chapter 6) before it is used in INFORM. Indicators 
have been chosen if they are open source and continuous, provide consistent global 
coverage and are potentially scalable from national to local level, from yearly to seasonal 
(monthly) scale. 
The data used in INFORM comes from international organisations and academic institutes 
and is considered to be the most reliable available. INFORM works directly with source 
organisations to ensure quality and appropriate use of the source data in INFORM. 
All levels of the INFORM model (from dimensions to indicators) are made available. 
Therefore, users can explore risk at different levels of detail and according to their 
specific needs and interest. The source data that makes up INFORM is also made 
available. 
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3 Changes in INFORM 2017 
3.1 Overview 
Since last year, we have made some changes to the INFORM methodology. The exposure 
layer used to calculate the Natural hazard components has been updated from 
LandScan © to the new Global Human Settlements Layer Population Grid produced by 
the European Commission JRC. The Global Conflict Risk Index, which is used in the 
‘Projected Conflict Risk’ component of INFORM, has been significantly improved. 
‘Maternal mortality ratio’ has been added as a new indicator in the ‘Access to health 
system’ component of the ‘Lack of coping capacity’ dimension. In addition, we have 
added a new measure of reliability, which is now displayed for every country. This has 
been introduced to increase transparency on the quality of data used to calculate 
INFORM, while still ensuring we include as many countries as possible. It is presented as 
a Lack of Reliability Index on a scale from 0-10 and takes into account missing data, out- 
of-date data, and conflict status. Countries with lower Lack of Reliability Index scores 
have risk scores that are based on more reliable data. 
3.2 New exposure layer 
From the 3rd release of the index in 2017, the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) 
Global Population Grid [25] became the exposure layer in the INFORM model. The GHSL 
Global Population Grid is already used as exposure layer in most of the INFORM 
subnational models, specifically in Lebanon, Guatemala, the Sahel, the Great Horn of 
Africa, central Asia and the Caucasus, Latin America and the Caribbean. The GHSL Global 
Population Grid fits all of INFORM’s requirements, being global coverage, open source, 
transparent methodology and high resolution for the subnational models. Another 
advantage of the GHSL Global Population Grid is the link with physical footprint of 
building, mapping of the resident people. This is very important for assessing the 
population exposed to natural hazards such as earthquakes and floods, where most of 
the causalities are caused by the destruction of the buildings. The INFORM Index is 
published yearly, and therefore a regular update of the GHSL Global Population Grid is 
needed in order to monitor the changes in exposure to natural hazards. 
3.3 Improvement in the processing of coastal hazards 
The enhanced spatial resolution of the GHSL Global Population Grid compared to the 
previous exposure layer, allowed the improvement of the estimation of the population 
exposed to coastal hazards like Tsunami, Cyclone’s wind and Surge. 
Furthermore, the processing of the Storm surge hazard data for better estimation of the 
hazards zone was revised (section 4.2.2.1). 
The global coastal inundation model used herein uses four variables: 1. the sea-level-
surge dataset (5), 2. the SRTM 90 m Digital Elevation Database (SRTM-90) [26] derived 
elevation classes, 3. the SRTM-90 derived continental shoreline, and 4. the GHLS 
population density datasets at 250 m. 
The SRTM-90 derived elevation classes were produced by recoding the continuous 
elevation values of SRTM-90 in the four elevation classes that include: 1. land areas 
below sea level, 2. land areas between sea level and 3 metres; 3. land areas included 
between 3 and 10 metres; and 4. land area above 10 m in elevation. 
The continental coastline was also extracted from the SRTM-90 datasets. SRTM-90 codes 
the ocean as no-data. The entire land masses of SRTM-90 were recoded as a binary file 
and the edge of the land masses were transformed into a vector that defines the 
                                           
(5)  Storm Surge hazard, GAR 2015, UNISDR: http://risk.preventionweb.net/capraviewer/download/SS-
World_g15179.zip 
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continental shoreline. GHSL population density datasets deliver population estimates at 
250 m × 250 m global grids. 
For coastal flood modelling the sea level surge datasets were processed based on the 
following assumptions: 
 The potential wave height calculated offshore remains unchanged when it hits 
land; 
 The inundation unfolds based on the height of the wave and the friction created 
by the land cover. 
These assumptions are justified considering the uncertainties in the wave calculations, 
the precision of the SRTM-90 digital elevation model and the recoding in the four 
elevation classes derived, and the global scope of this exercise. 
The sea level surge datasets include points regularly distanced along the edges of the 
continents. The attributes of the points record the potential wave height at different 
return periods. To make this dataset suitable for an inundation model, the wave height 
points were translated to the nearest shoreline based on least distance operation. The 
points were crossed with the elevation classes. The elevation class that matches the 
surge height was used in the modelling. The penetration of the inundation wave was 
modelled based on an empirical equation (6) [27], [28], [29]. The operation defines the 
inundation area. That inundation area was then crossed with the GHSL population density 
to produce a potential exposed population to sea level surge. 
The processing included standardisation of the four datasets to a common reference layer 
and the recoding of the potential inundation areas to the 250 m used in GHSL. 
3.4 Global Conflict Risk Index 
For the Human hazard category, we profit from a more elaborated model of the Global 
Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) that offers the Projected Risk of Conflict for each individual 
country. The GCRI is a quantitative model developed by the JRC that uses structural 
indicators to determine the probability of conflict within the coming years. Compared to 
earlier versions, the GCRI now includes 24 variables such as the country’s conflict 
history, regime type, and ethnic compilation as well as other socioeconomic, political, 
geographic, and security variables that contribute to the outbreak of civil war (7). Conflict 
intensity levels as used in the GCRI are provided by the Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research (HIIK). As the GCRI as well as the HIIK are purely data 
driven and composed of broadly accepted quantitative factors that add up to a 
comprehensive reflection of risk for and consequences of armed conflict, it allows us to 
complement our risk assessment with a man-made variable and contributes adequately 
to the overall predictive abilities of the model. 
The best-performing model for subnational and national power was selected to determine 
the risk for each dimension of conflict. We selected a model that includes a country set of 
all states with more than 500 000 inhabitants that makes use of an interaction between 
the regime type, the GDP/capita in the country, and the income inequality as determined 
by the SWIID dataset (8). This model is run without EU Member States to even enhance 
its performance. 
The model gives us predictions for the projected risk of conflict for both violent and 
highly violent conflicts. Trained on conflicts in both dimensions since 1989 and applied to 
                                           
(6)  The storm surge intrusion distance is computed using equation (2) developed by Freeman and Le Mehaute 
(1964) and used in the Multipurpose Cyclone Shelter Programme (1992). 
(7)  The complete methodology of the GCRI is available via http://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu.  
(8)  The Standardised World Income Inequality Dataset uses a custom missing-data algorithm to standardise 
inequality data from sources such as the United Nations. It covers 174 countries for as many years as 
possible since the 1960s to the present along with estimates of uncertainty in these statistics. More 
information on the SWIID is provided in Solt, Frederick. 2009. ‘Standardizing the World Income Inequality 
Database’, Social Science Quarterly 90(2):231-242. 
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the most recent data available, the GCRI has a true positive rate of 79 % for conflicts 
over national power and 74 % for subnational conflict. 
A number of important features are added with the latest version of the GCRI. The 
construction of the dataset is now made more transparent and reproducible by the use of 
R scripts rather than the previous Excel-based approach. The use of machine imputation 
for missing data has been replaced with a system where data is taken from either the 
closest known historical data, from regional averages, or from similar countries. The 
imputation is now included in the data construction phase, and so the data is now a 
single, complete dataset ready for statistical analysis. 
The previous model validation work was repeated using the new data to verify that 
earlier findings still hold true. The old code was then cleaned of superfluous material, and 
the remaining code was adapted and simplified to make it easier to use. The code that 
comes with the current version is designed as a tool to produce the GCRI rather than to 
test multiple models. 
3.5 New indicator: Maternal mortality rate 
The majority (61 %) of maternal deaths occur in the 35 countries currently affected by a 
humanitarian crisis or fragile conditions. This equates to an estimated ratio of 417 
maternal deaths per 100 000 live births, which is 1.9 times higher than the global 
estimated ratio of 216 [27]. 
Maternal mortality (MM) is significantly correlated with disaster mortality, and is 
therefore a key indicator of vulnerability and adaptive capacity [20] as well as of 
predicting the severity of impact [32]. Also, a study of maternal mortality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa showed significantly higher levels in countries that had a recent conflict relative to 
those that had not [33]. 
Poor maternal health outcomes are often linked to three delays: (1) delay in decision to 
seek care (due to low status of women, lack of knowledge of complications and risk 
factors, financial implications); (2) delay in reaching care (due to distance to reach 
health facilities, availability and cost of transport, poor roads and infrastructure, 
geographical terrain; and (3) delay in receiving adequate health care (due to poor 
facilities and lack of medical supplies, inadequate referral system, lack of qualified 
medical staff). Emergency and humanitarian situations exacerbate the impact of each of 
the three delays leading to higher risks of maternal morbidity and mortality. Maternal 
mortality is thus one of the best integrated indicators of both the status of women, and 
the strength of the health system, including accessibility and capacity of services linked 
to the presence and functionality of basic infrastructure such as roads, health facilities, 
etc. 
Unlike other emergency health responses like child mortality, maternal death is also a 
uniquely valuable indicator of overall population vulnerability given the fact that this 
‘emergency’ event is actually anticipated and therefore can, and should be, planned for if 
services and roads allow. It is a sufficiently dangerous and rapid event once underway 
that it provides much information on the overall capacity of a household and/or 
community to plan, coordinate, and mobilise available resources to save not only one life, 
but two lives — hence it says much about adaptive capacity in communities. For these 
reasons, maternal mortality is referred to as a ‘system-level’ indicator [34], with 
interventions to address it that cut across sectors and risk reduction measures. 
Other health system level indicators in INFORM — vaccine coverage, physician density, 
private health care expenditure, health of children under five and communicable diseases 
— do not capture the capacity of communities or health systems to respond to 
emergency health needs, let alone emergencies that have known and anticipated risks. 
Maternal mortality offers a valuable indicator of structural vulnerability, and the coping 
capacity of a country with regard to crisis, in ways that have not yet been captured in 
INFORM Index. 
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‘Maternal mortality rate’ has been added as a new indicator in the ‘Access to health 
system’ component of the ‘Lack of coping capacity’ dimension. 
3.6 Lack of Reliability Index 
A measure of reliability is now displayed for each country. It is presented as a Lack of 
Reliability Index on a scale from 0-10 and takes into account missing data, out-of-date 
data, and conflict status. Countries with lower Lack of Reliability Index scores have risk 
scores that are based on more reliable data. 
The Lack of Reliability Index has been added to increase transparency about the quality 
of data used to calculate INFORM, while still ensuring we include all the INFORM 
countries. 
In some cases, for example due to an ongoing conflict, the most recent data available 
does not accurately reflect the current situation. Rather than excluding these countries 
from the analysis, or impute missing data, INFORM partners decided to add a measure of 
reliability so that users will be aware of such cases. 
3.6.1 Methodology 
The INFORM Lack of Reliability Index includes three dimensions, 1. missing data, 2. out- 
of-date data and 3. conflict status. 
1. The first dimension considers how many original indicators were available for 
calculating the INFORM index for each country. It uses as indicator the number of 
missing values, which includes also estimated values not present in the original data 
source. For instance, the HDI value derived from the GDP per capita is considered as 
missing value for the calculation of the Lack of Reliability Index. 
2. The second dimension looks to how recent are the data used for a particular country. 
INFORM methodology allows to use older data as proxy where updated data are not 
available. The metrics used for the Lack of Reliability Index is the average of the total 
number of the years older than the reference year for each indicator. 
The last dimension takes into account if a country is in conflict. Normally collection of 
data in country affected by conflict is very challenging and therefore their reliability is 
poor. We define a country in conflict if the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute 
for International Conflict Research (HIIK) sets a conflict intensity 4 o 5 (highly violent 
conflict). The first two dimensions are normalised between 0 and 10 as an INFORM 
indicator, while the conflict dimension counts as an aggravating factor of 30 %. 
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Figure 4. INFORM Lack of Reliability Index methodology.  
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4 Component and core indicator selection 
4.1 Introduction 
A composite indicator is typically a compromise between a data-driven and a user-driven 
model. There are always some components that existing data cannot describe, especially 
if the demands for quality of data are very high. 
When selecting the indicators, the possible scalability in geographical and temporal scale 
is always considered as an important property for the future development of the INFORM 
index. 
The following chapters present the component selection for each dimension and explain 
the aggregation rules within different levels of the INFORM model. 
4.2 Dimension: Hazard & exposure 
4.2.1 Overview 
The Hazard & exposure dimension reflects the probability of physical exposure associated 
with specific hazards. There is no risk if there is no physical exposure, no matter how 
severe the hazardous event is. Therefore, the hazard and exposure dimensions are 
merged into Hazard & exposure dimension. As such it represents the load that the 
community has to deal with when exposed to a hazardous event. 
Box 1. Variations in the subnational models: Hazard & exposure 
— An INFORM subnational model uses the same risk assessment methodology and 
development process, but is adapted to regional or national level (9). 
— Regarding the Natural hazards dimension, there was a large use of local hazard maps 
(Lebanon, Colombia, East Africa), a suggestion to include epidemics as natural 
hazard, in particularly Ebola outbreak (Sahel), an inclusion of land degradation, food 
security (Sahel), forest fire (Lebanon), landslides (Colombia, central Asia and 
Caucasus) as natural hazards. 
— In the Human hazards dimension, a large benefit of regional/local data should be 
noticed (ACLED (10) in Africa, local sources in Lebanon and Colombia). 
 
4.2.1.1 Hazard & exposure: Categories 
The dimension comprises two categories: Natural hazards and Human hazards, 
aggregated with the geometric mean, where both indexes carry equal weight within the 
dimension. 
                                           
(9)  INFORM Guidance Note 2016 (http://www.inform-index.org). 
(10)  http://www.acleddata.com 
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Figure 5. Graphical presentation of the Hazard & exposure dimension 
 
4.2.2 Category: Natural hazard 
4.2.2.1 Definition 
According to the CRED EM-DAT database [22] the death toll of natural hazards during 
1900-1999 is caused in 86.9 % of cases by famines, 12.9% by floods, earthquakes and 
storms, and less than 0.2 % by volcanic eruptions, landslides and wildfires. On the other 
hand the rapid onset hazards with a more limited geographic extent, sometimes labelled 
as extensive disasters, seldom exceed entry criteria (11) of the EM-DAT database. From 
that point of view their presence in the database is incomplete and the cumulative death 
toll is higher, while a single event rarely causes a humanitarian crisis. 
Rapid-onset hazards, i.e. earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical cyclones and floods, are dealt 
with differently than slow-onset hazards, i.e. droughts. Indicators for each component of 
rapid-onset hazards are based on the physical exposure to the hazard. 
The metric for the natural hazard risk used in INFORM is the annual average 
exposed population (AAEP) or, when hazard maps for different return periods are not 
available, annual exposed population (AEP). 
                                           
(11) Hazardous events have to fulfil at least one of the following criteria, in order to be included in the database 
(http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions): 
 10 or more people reported killed; 
 100 people reported affected; 
 Declaration of a state of emergency; 
 Call for international assistance. 
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They are defined in Chapter 3.2 of the INFORM Concept and Methodology Report 2016 
[18]. They are closely related to the definition of the hazard zones. 
The hazard zone does not contain information on internal variability of intensity. The 
population is either in the hazard zone or outside, the people are either exposed or not, 
respectively. The exposure of the population is thus a binary value, rather than a degree 
of exposure. 
Furthermore, in the case of earthquakes and cyclone winds, the available hazard maps 
provide information on different intensity level zones. The hazard zones where minimum 
intensity is set to low intensities inherit also the hazard zones with high intensities but 
their more detrimental impact is not visible with a simple overlay of the population map. 
It would be high intensity events that would more likely cause humanitarian crises. 
To overcome this shortcoming of the hazard zone definition the areas of high intensities 
within the hazard zone of low intensities were extracted. Their presence was introduced 
into the model as a parallel indicator at the sub-component level where AAEP was based 
on the hazard zone with the higher minimum intensity level. We took the advantage of 
the composite indicator methodology and considered the areas of high intensities as 
another type of event with the same probability of occurrence. Such indicator pushes up 
the countries exposed to extreme events as well as pull down those countries where high 
intensity events are not very likely to happen and/or are spatially very limited. The final 
hazard component indicator is a geometric average of the normalised AAEP gained from 
two hazard zones of two distinct levels of minimum intensity, i.e. a low as well as 
extreme one. A high hazard component indicator is the result of high values in both 
levels of intensities. While low values of the indicator for high intensities will decrease 
high values of the indicator for low intensities and indirectly suggest that despite the high 
number of people exposed the share of affected people is expected to be comparatively 
smaller. 
There are different intensity scales for different hazard types, e.g. Modified Mercalli 
Intensity (MMI) scale for earthquakes and Saffir-Simpson (SS) hurricane scale for 
cyclone wind. For each hazard type we chose intensity levels equivalent to two distinct 
damage levels: 
 Light/moderate potential damage for resistant/vulnerable buildings, respectively; and 
 Moderate/heavy potential damage for resistant/vulnerable buildings, respectively. 
In the case of the earthquakes MMI VI and VIII, while in the case of the cyclone winds SS 
1 and 3 fit the chosen damage levels description (Table 3). 
Table 2. Minimum intensity/magnitude levels used for different type of hazards and data source 
Hazard 
type 
Intensity levels Source 
Earthquake 
Modified Mercalli Intensity 
scale VI and VIII 
GSHAP Seismic hazard intensity map 
(475-return period, 10 % probability of 
exceedance in 50-year of exposure ) 
Tsunami Inundated area 
Tsunami Hazard (Run up) RP 500 years 
(GAR 2015) 
Flood Inundated area 
Flood hazard map 25, 50, 100, 500, 1 000 
years RP (GAR 2015) 
Cyclone 
wind 
Saffir-Simpson category 1 
and 3 
Cyclone wind hazard map 50, 100, 250, 
500, 1 000 years RP (GAR 2015) 
Storm 
surge 
Inundated area 
Storm surge hazard map 10, 25, 50, 100, 
250 years RP (GAR 2015) 
Drought 
Impact (affected people) and 
frequency of drought 
disasters 
EM-DAT database for the period 1990- 
now 
 Agricultural drought: 30 % of Map of annual agricultural drought based 
 21 
cropland in stress for more 
than 10 days 
on remote sensing (ASI, FAO 2014) 
 
Table 3. Intensity scale levels vs. damage level 
Hazard 
type 
Intensity 
levels 
Damage level Reference 
Earthquake 
Modified 
Mercalli 
scale VI 
Perceived shaking: strong 
Resistant structures: light damage 
Vulnerable structures: moderate damage 
USGS(PAGER) (12) 
 
Modified 
Mercalli 
scale VIII 
Perceived shaking: severe 
Resistant structures: moderate/heavy 
damage 
Vulnerable structures: heavy damage 
USGS(PAGER) 
Cyclone 
wind 
Saffir-
Simpson 
category 1 
Wind speed: 119-153 km/h 
Very dangerous winds will produce 
some damage: Well-constructed frame 
homes could have damage to roof, shingles, 
vinyl siding and gutters. Large branches of 
trees will snap and shallowly rooted trees 
may be toppled. Extensive damage to power 
lines and poles likely will result in power 
outages that could last a few to several 
days. 
NOAA (13) 
 
Saffir-
Simpson 
category 3 
Wind speed: 178-208 km/h 
Devastating damage will occur: Well-built 
framed homes may incur major damage or 
removal of roof decking and gable ends. 
Many trees will be snapped or uprooted, 
blocking numerous roads. Electricity and 
water will be unavailable for several days to 
weeks after the storm passes 
NOAA 
 
  
                                           
(12) http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3036/pdf/FS10-3036.pdf 
(13) http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php 
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Box 2. Absolute vs. relative physical exposure — correction in favour of small countries 
There are two ways to consider population exposed to natural hazards. The absolute 
value of people exposed will favour more populated countries while the value of 
population exposed relative to the total population will reverse the problem and favour 
less populated hazard-prone countries, especially small islands where the entire 
population may be affected by a single cyclone. To enable a proper comparison between 
countries, in INFORM the subcomponent indicator is calculated both ways and then 
aggregated using an arithmetic average. 
At the level of core indicators (Table 5) the datasets are rescaled into a range of 0 to 10 
in combination with a min–max normalisation. Since distribution of the absolute value of 
exposed people is extremely skewed, the log transformation is applied (Chapter 6). 
4.2.2.2 Natural hazards: components 
The Natural hazard category includes five components aggregated with a geometric 
average (Table 5): 
● Earthquake, 
● Tsunami, 
● Flood, 
● Tropical cyclone (Cyclone wind and Storm surge), 
● Drought (Historical impact and Agricultural drought probability). 
Table 4. Indicators of the Natural hazard category 
Component Indicator Source MIN–MAX No of 
missing 
values 
Earthquake 
Physical exposure to MMI VI 
earthquake (absolute) 
GSHAP 
Log(10)- 
Log(10E5) 
- 
Physical exposure to MMI VI 
earthquake (relative) 
GSHAP; GHSL-
POP 
0 %-0.2 % - 
Physical exposure to MMI VIII 
earthquake (absolute) 
GSHAP 
Log(10)- 
Log(10E4) 
- 
Physical exposure to MMI VIII 
earthquake (relative) 
GSHAP; GHSL-
POP 
0 %-0.1 % - 
Tsunami 
Physical exposure to tsunamis 
(absolute) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015 
Log(10E-2)- 
Log(10E3) 
- 
Physical exposure to tsunamis 
(relative) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015; GHSL-
POP 
Log(10E-9)- 
Log(10E-4.5) 
- 
Flood 
Physical exposure to flood (absolute) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015 
Log(100)- 
Log(10E6) 
32/191 
Physical exposure to flood (relative) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015; GHSL-
POP 
0 %-1 % 32/191 
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Tropical 
cyclone 
Physical exposure to SS-1 tropical 
cyclone (absolute) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015 
Log(100)- 
Log(10E6) 
- 
Physical exposure to SS-1 tropical 
cyclone (relative) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015; GHSL-
POP 
0 %-2 % - 
Physical exposure to SS-3 tropical 
cyclone (absolute) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015 
Log(1)- 
Log(10E6) 
- 
Physical exposure to SS-3 tropical 
cyclone (relative) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015; GHSL-
POP 
0 %-0.5 % - 
Physical exposure to Storm surges 
(absolute) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015 
Log(10E-2)- 
Log(10E3) 
- 
Physical exposure to Storm surge 
(relative) 
UNISDR GAR 
2015: GHSL-
POP 
Log(10E-9)- 
Log(10E-4) 
- 
Drought 
Agriculture drought probability FAO 0-0.3 21/191 
People affected by droughts 
(absolute) 
EM-DAT, CRED 
Log(10)- 
Log(10E5) 
- 
People affected by droughts (relative) EM-DAT, CRED 0 %-3 % - 
Frequency of droughts events EM-DAT, CRED 0-0.3 - 
 
Table 5. Aggregation of the Natural hazards category 
Category Natural hazard 
Component 
GEOMETRIC AVERAGE 
Earthquake Tsunami Flood Tropical Cyclone Drought 
Aggregation 
GEOMETRIC AVERAGE 
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Absolute    Absolute value of physical exposure (AAEP)   
Relative   Relative value of physical exposure (AAEP per capita). AAEP is    
normalised with the country’s population. 
 
 
Scalability: Approach used enables geographical and temporal scalability of physical 
exposure. Hazard zones and population distribution maps allow extraction of subnational 
indicators as well as adaptation to mid-term and long-term variability when applying 
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El Niño scenarios or observed trends in climate changes, and incorporating seasonality of 
weather-related hazard events. 
4.2.2.3 Component: Earthquake 
Earthquakes can be one of the most destructive natural hazards. The unpredictability of 
the seismic event can cause several fatalities in areas with high physical vulnerability of 
the buildings (2010 Haiti, 2015 Nepal). 
Data source: As described in the 2016 INFORM Concept and Methodology Report [18] in 
INFORM GSHAP probabilistic hazard map is used. It is available only for 475-year return 
period, which only enables the derivation of the exposed population for that particular 
return period. 
Technical explanation to derive hazard zone: GSHAP seismic hazard map shows 
different intensity levels of earthquake presented in terms of PGA. In INFORM a derived 
product based on GSHAP dataset was used, converted to Modified Mercalli Intensity 
(MMI) using the methodology developed by Wald et al. [35]. This product was compiled 
by CIESIN (Columbia University) for the Global Assessment Report on Risk Reduction 
(GAR 2009-2011) (14). 
Two hazard zones for each country were extracted using two different minimum intensity 
levels, i.e. MMI VI and MMI VIII (Table 3). The choice of the minimum intensities is 
simply based on two distinct damage levels. This is a way to overcome the hazard zone 
definition that ignores the internal variability of the hazard intensity and it takes 
advantage of the composite indicator methodology. We consider a hazard zone with a 
higher minimum intensity as another event and aggregate the metric derived with the 
geometric average into earthquake component (Table 5). 
4.2.2.4 Component: Tsunami 
As earthquakes, tsunamis can be very destructive. Even if the frequency of the events is 
very low, the humanitarian impact of the most intensive tsunamis is huge (2004 Indian 
Ocean, 2011 Japan). 
Data source: GAR 2015 [36] provides tsunami hazard map for only one return period, 
i.e. 500-year RP. The score of the Tsunami component is based on the exposed 
population for 500-year RP only. 
Technical explanation to derive hazard zone: The GAR Tsunami hazard map displays 
binary information on the probable inundated areas. Those areas represent the hazard 
zones. 
4.2.2.5 Component: Flood 
Floods are often predictable natural hazards, which can encompass incredibly large 
areas, causing a very large impact on population (2010 Pakistan). 
Data source: Several sources for global probabilistic flood hazard maps are available: 
● GloFAS-JRC global flood hazard maps, developed by the Joint Research Centre of 
European Commission [37]. The maps are based on long-term hydrological 
simulations of the Global Flood Awareness System (GloFAS), coupled with 
hydrodynamic modelling at 1 km resolution. 
● The Aqueduct Global Flood Maps (15) are based on the Glofris (16) model recently 
developed by research institute Deltares [38]. It uses hydrological data from 1960 
through 1999 for generating flood inundations for nine return periods, from 2-year 
flood to 1 000-year flood. They are publicly available. 
                                           
(14)  http://preview.grid.unep.ch/index.php?preview=data&events=earthquakes&evcat=5&lang=eng 
(15)  http://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/aqueduct-global-flood-risk-maps 
(16)  Global Flood Risk with IMAGE Scenarios. 
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● GAR 2015 flood hazard maps for 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1 000-year RP [39]. 
The hazard maps are developed at 1 km × 1 km resolution. GAR 2015 flood maps 
do not take into account flood defences. They are publicly available. 
They produce different results and consequently different implications for risk. There is 
ongoing study on comparison of different flood models at the University of Bristol, which 
will provide more information on benefits and drawbacks of each. At the moment, the 
GAR 2015 [36] flood hazard maps are used in INFORM 2016. The score of the Flood 
component is based on the AAEP risk metrics. 
Technical explanation to derive hazard zone: The GAR 2015 flood hazard map 
displays probable inundated areas related to a specific return period. Inundated areas are 
not broken down into different water height levels, so only binary information is provided 
for each point, which is positive if the location is inundated and negative if not. The 
hazard zones are derived from all inundated areas for each return period. 
4.2.2.6 Component: Tropical cyclone 
Tropical cyclones (including hurricanes and typhoons) are some of the most damaging 
events. They occur in yearly cycles and affect coastal population through high wind 
speeds (destroying dwellings and infrastructure), storm surge and associated floods 
(destroying crops) and heavy rainfall sometimes causing riverine floods and landslides. 
The tropical cyclone component is an aggregation with arithmetic average of the physical 
exposure for cyclone wind and cyclone surge. 
Data source: GAR 2015 [36] provides cyclone wind intensity maps for 50, 100, 250, 
500, 1 000 years RP. The score of the Cyclone wind component is based on AAEP risk 
metrics. 
Technical explanation to derive hazard zone: GAR 2015 cyclone wind hazard maps 
display different intensity levels of cyclone wind presented in terms of Saffir-Simpson 
Hurricane Scale (Category 1-5). Therefore two hazard zones for each country were 
extracted for the same return period using two different minimum intensity levels, i.e. 
SS1 and SS3 (Table 3). 
Data source: GAR 2015 provides Storm surge hazard maps for 10, 25, 50, 100, 
250 years RP. The score of the Storm surge component is based on AAEP risk metrics. 
Technical explanation to derive hazard zone: GAR 2015 Storm surge hazard maps 
are expressed in points along the coast representing the expected storm surge level. In 
order to derive the hazard zone, first the point layer was converted into a raster. Then 
for each pixel the information of surge level was compared with the terrain elevation (17). 
The pixels where the expected surge level is higher or equal than the DEM, define the 
hazard zone. 
4.2.2.7 Component: Drought 
Drought is a complex process to model because of the inherent spatial and temporal 
uncertainty. In general terms, a drought can be understood as a deficiency in 
precipitation that severely affects a certain region, environment, industry, or people. 
According to the FAO, droughts are ‘the world’s most destructive natural hazard’ with 
‘devastating impacts on food security and food production’. The frequency as well as 
intensity of droughts has increased in the past 20 years due to climate change and it is 
expected that this trend will intensify in the future. 
In INFORM, the impact of drought is measured by a combination of two factors: 1. the 
risk for drought, calculated as the probability for an agricultural drought (which may or 
may not result in a drought disaster through reduced food production) and 2. the 
population affected by droughts in recent years (materialised risk). 
                                           
(17)  SRTM digital elevation model. 
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For the first factor, we define an agricultural drought as a dry period in a certain region, 
in which at least 30 % of the crop area was in stress for more than 10 days. This is 
measured using the Agriculture Stress Index (ASI) (18), which is an index based on the 
integration of the Vegetation Health Index (VHI) in two dimensions that are critical in the 
assessment of a drought event in agriculture: temporal and spatial [40]. The first step of 
the ASI calculation is a temporal averaging of the VHI, assessing the intensity and 
duration of dry periods occurring during the crop cycle at pixel level. The second step 
determines the spatial extent of drought events by calculating the percentage of pixels in 
arable areas with a VHI value below 35 %. 
We consider a country in drought in a particular year if the ASI index indicates drought in 
one or more crop seasons. While the drought probability is based on the country’s 
frequency of droughts within the last 30 years. 
The second factor, historical drought impact, considers the number of affected people per 
year (both absolute and relative to the country’s population size) based on historical 
events in EM-DAT database for the last 25 years, which is the period when reporting is 
assumed to be consistent. To emphasise drought-prone countries with frequent and 
extensive drought (as well as to compensate for uncertainty associated with unique, 
intensive drought events), we combine the average annual drought-affected people with 
the frequency of drought events in an arithmetic average. 
The calculation of drought risk has several limitations, which have to be taken into 
account. First of all, the ASI model does not consider the impact of drought on 
pastoralism. Second, due to the coarse resolution of ASI, countries smaller than 
1 000 km2 are not considered. Lastly, the applicability of historical impact data is limited, 
as people ‘affected’ by drought are not consistently defined over events (in EM-DAT). 
Note that food security is a component under the Vulnerable group category in 
Vulnerability dimension (Chapter 4.3.4). Food insecurity increases the population’s 
vulnerability to new shocks. 
Scalability: A useful feature of the ASI index is the geographical and temporal 
scalability, i.e. calculation of subnational indexes with seasonal component based on the 
historical archive of remote sensing data. 
4.2.3 Category: Human hazard 
4.2.3.1 Definition 
Human-made hazards are either technological (e.g. industrial accidents with 
environmental impact) or sociological in nature. The latter encompass such divergent 
phenomena as civil wars, high-intensity crime, civil unrest as well as terrorism. Especially 
armed internal conflict yields catastrophic results for populations and economies and is 
almost always accompanied by humanitarian risk on a larger scale, caused by the 
breakdown of supply lines, absent harvests, refugee flows as well as an overall 
deterioration of health services. 
4.2.3.2 Human hazard: Components 
INFORM includes two quantitative variables on man-made disaster that complement the 
Hazard & exposure section with the dimension of violent conflict and the consequences 
generated by it, such as large refugee flows and overall destruction of infrastructure. 
                                           
(18)  It is developed by FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) and the Climate, Energy 
and Tenure Division. 
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Table 6. Indicators of the Human hazard category 
Component Indicator Source MIN–MAX 
No of 
missing 
values 
Conflict intensity 
National power conflicts Conflict Barometer, HIIK 4-5 - 
Subnational power conflicts Conflict Barometer, HIIK 4-5 - 
Projected risk of 
conflict 
Probability for violent 
conflict 
Global Conflict Risk Index, 
JRC 
0-0.95 - 
Probability for highly violent 
conflict 
Global Conflict Risk Index, 
JRC 
Log(0.01)- 
Log(0.95) 
- 
 
Scalability: Subnational and monthly updates could be supported by the Conflict 
Barometer but they are not yet available. Data exist, at the moment, only for scientific 
purposes. The GCRI is planned to be updated in semi-annual intervals. 
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4.2.3.3 Component: Conflict intensity 
INFORM takes into account the current intensity of conflict in a country or — in case 
there is currently no conflict — an estimate of future conflict probability. To determine 
the current intensity of a conflict, we use data by the annual Conflict Barometer [41] 
of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) (19). 
                                           
(
19
)  The HIIK approach distinguishes a total of five intensity levels, subdivided into non-violent conflicts 
(Disputes and Non-violent Crises) and violent conflicts (Violent Crises, Limited Wars, and Wars). 
The overall intensity is determined by the number of casualties and refugees caused by conflict, as well as 
by the number of personnel involved, the weapons that were used, and the destruction that was caused. 
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Table 8. Adaption of conflict intensity 
Type of conflict HIIK intensity INFORM conflict 
intensity 
Non-violent 
conflict 
1 (dispute) 
2 (non-violent crisis) 
0-5 
Violent conflict 3 (violent crisis) 5-8 
Highly violent 
conflict 
4 (limited war) 
5 (war) 
9-10 
The HIIK defines conflict as a dynamic process made up of a sequence of interlocking 
conflict episodes. The conflict intensity is determined by two criteria: Instruments on the 
use of force (use of weapons and use of personnel) and the consequences of the use of 
force (casualties, refugees, and demolition). Its values (Table 8) range from 1 (dispute) 
to 5 (war). 
For our purpose, we cluster the conflicts observed by the HIIK into three different 
groups: 
● Conflicts over national power in a country (National power); 
● Over intrastate items apart from national power such as secession (Subnational); 
● Interstate conflicts (20). 
We clearly distinguish conflicts over national power from those over subnational items, as 
they have different causes and drivers that attributes to onset, duration, and escalation 
of violence. 
Table 9. Conflict items, groups, and intensity 
HIIK conflict item  
INFORM conflict 
groups  
HIIK intensity 
level 
INFORM conflict 
intensity 
National power National power 
5 (war) 10 
4 (limited war) 8 
Secession 
Autonomy 
Subnational 
predominance 
Subnational 
5 (war) 9 
4 (limited war) 7 
Any 
Violent conflict with 
lower intensity 
3 (violent crisis) Not considered 
International power 
Territory 
Interstate - Not considered 
                                                                                                                                    
The basic data is provided by the HIIK’s annual Conflict Barometer which includes information about more 
than 400 political conflicts in the world (see http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/). 
(20)  In our model, we only take into consideration the two intrastate dimensions of conflict. This has several 
reasons: First of all, scientific evidence shows that interstate conflict has become a rather rare 
phenomenon since the end of the Cold War. Besides, if military confrontations between states occur, they 
are mostly restricted to remote border regions and tend not to last longer than several weeks or even 
days, whereby they do not affect the civilian population as much as intrastate conflicts. 
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In INFORM we consider conflicts over national power to have a graver impact on 
population, supplies, and long-term development than those over subnational items. First 
of all, they constrain the overall national production and supply lines and are mostly 
fought with heavier weapons and more personnel and turn more people into refugees 
than conflicts over e.g. secession. Second, wars over government usually affect large 
parts of national territory and often have the tendency of involving foreign powers. 
Subnational conflicts are mostly restricted to certain regions of a country and only affect 
regional production and security. We therefore transfer the HIIK data on conflict intensity 
into a modified intensity scale: Conflicts with HIIK intensity 5 receive an INFORM 
intensity of 10 if the object is National power, and 9 if the object is Subnational. 
Analogously, conflicts with HIIK intensity 4 (limited wars) are attributed values of 8 
(National power) and 7 (Subnational). 
4.2.3.4 Component: Projected risk of conflict 
If a country does not experience highly violent conflict in the year of observation, 
INFORM estimates instead the Projected Risk of Conflict using the Global Conflict Risk 
Index (GCRI). The GCRI [42] is a quantitative model developed by the JRC that uses 
structural indicators to determine a given country’s risk for conflict. It uses 26 
quantitative variables including, among others, a country’s regime type, its conflict 
history as well as other socioeconomic, political, geographic and security variables that 
contribute to the outbreak of civil war. Intensity levels as used in the GCRI are thereby 
also provided by the HIIK. INFORM uses the GCRI assessment of the risk for violent 
conflict within the next 4 years. The risk for either violent conflict (VC) or highly violent 
conflict (HVC) is calculated using the geometric average of the probability for either type 
of conflict, with a log transformation of the HVC. A probability of 95 % is thereby 
equivalent to a risk level of 7. 
 
Figure 6. Transformation of GCRI probability of conflicts to INFORM score 
 
The total risk score for the Human hazard category is then calculated by using the 
maximum score of either the actual conflict intensity or the projected intensity. As the 
GCRI as well as the HIIK are purely data-driven and composed of broadly accepted 
quantitative factors that add up to a comprehensive reflection of risk for and 
consequences of armed conflict, it allows us to complement our risk assessment with a 
man-made variable and contributes adequately to the overall predictive abilities of the 
model. 
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4.3 Dimension: Vulnerability 
4.3.1 Overview 
The main focus of humanitarian organisations is people, which is the element at risk 
contemplated in the INFORM composite index. The impact of disasters on people in terms 
of number of people killed, injured, and made homeless is predominantly felt in 
developing countries while the economic costs of disasters are concentrated in the 
industrialised world. The Vulnerability dimension addresses the intrinsic predispositions of 
an exposed population to be affected, or to be susceptible to the damaging effects of a 
hazard, even though the assessment is made through hazard-independent indicators. So, 
the Vulnerability dimension represents economic, political and social characteristics of the 
community that can be destabilised in case of a hazardous event. Physical vulnerability, 
which is a hazard dependent characteristic, is dealt with separately in the Hazard & 
exposure dimension. 
Box 3. Variations in the subnational models: Vulnerability 
An INFORM Subnational model uses the same risk assessment methodology and 
development process, but is adapted to regional or national level (21). 
Relevant additions were the inclusion of remittances (Sahel), food security (Cadre 
Harmonisé in Sahel), and malnutrition (Sahel). 
4.3.2 Vulnerability: Categories 
There are two categories aggregated through the geometric average: Socio-economic 
vulnerability and vulnerable groups. The indicators used in each category are different in 
time variability and the social groups considered in each category are the target of 
different humanitarian organisations. If the socio-economic vulnerability category refers 
more to the demography of a country in general, the vulnerable group category captures 
social groups with limited access to social and health care systems. 
                                           
(21)  INFORM Guidance Note 2016 (http://www.inform-index.org). 
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Figure 7. Graphical presentation of the vulnerability dimension 
 
4.3.3 Category: Socio-economic vulnerability 
4.3.3.1 Definition 
The question is what makes a population vulnerable when faced by a hazardous event. In 
most cases vulnerability has a negative relationship with the provision of basic needs. In 
such cases vulnerability is closely related to the level of self-protection mechanisms. 
Therefore, the Socio-economic vulnerability category tries to measure the (in)ability of 
individuals or households to afford safe and resilient livelihood conditions and well-being. 
These in turn dictate whether people can live in safe houses and locations as well as 
maintain an adequate health in terms of nutrition and preventive medicine to be resistant 
to increased health risk and reduced food intake in the case of disasters. Socio-economic 
vulnerability depends only in part on adequate income. Other deficiencies can be 
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corrected with adequate development level that strengthens those cultural processes, 
which raise level of awareness and knowledge. 
4.3.3.2 Socio-economic vulnerability: Components 
INFORM describes population performance with the weighted arithmetic average of three 
components (Table 11). 
Table 10. Indicators of the socio-economic vulnerability category 
Component Indicator Source MIN– 
MAX 
No of 
missing 
values 
Development & 
deprivation 
Human Development Index 
Human Development Report, 
UNDP 
0.3-0.95 6/191 
Multidimensional Poverty 
Index 
Human Development Report, 
UNDP 
0.05-0.5 100/191 
Inequality 
GINI index World Bank 25-65 56/191 
Gender Inequality 
Distribution 
Human Development Report, 
UNDP 
0-0.75 39/191 
Aid dependency 
Total ODA in the last 
2 years per capita 
OECD 
0-500 
- 
Global Humanitarian 
Funding per capita 
Financial Tracking System, 
UNOCHA 
- 
Net ODA Received in 
percentage of GDP 
World Bank 
0 %-
15 % 
- 
 
Scalability: All core indicators (Table 10) of Socio-economic vulnerability are published 
annually. The data for indicators of Development & deprivation, and Inequality 
component are available on subnational level, while the unit of analysis for the indicators 
of the aid dependency component is country. 
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Table 11. Aggregation of the Socio-Economic vulnerability category 
Category Socio-Economic vulnerability 
Aggregation 
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE 50/25/25 
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Component 
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4.3.3.3 Component: Development & deprivation 
The Development & deprivation component describes how a population is doing on 
average. It comprises two well recognised composite indices by UNDP: the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The Human 
Development Index covers both social and economic development and combines factors 
of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income. While the Multidimensional 
Poverty Index identifies overlapping deprivations at the household level across the same 
three dimensions as the Human Development Index (living standards, health, and 
education), it also includes the average number of poor people and deprivations, with 
which poor households contend. Even though dealing with similar dimensions, there is no 
double counting. If HDI measures capabilities in the corresponding dimension, MPI 
reflects the prevalence of multidimensional deprivation and its intensity in terms of how 
many deprivations people experience at the same time. However both indexes have a 
transparent methodology [43] with a justified choice of indicators and should be 
considered as a whole. This component is weighted 50 % to fairly convey the 
contribution of both aspects, development as well as deprivation. 
4.3.3.4 Component: Inequality 
The Inequality component introduces the dispersion of conditions within population 
presented in Development & deprivation component with two proxy measures: the Gini 
index by the World Bank and Gender Inequality Index by UNDP. The Gini index (named 
after Italian statistician and sociologist Corrado Gini) measures how evenly distributed 
resident’s income is among a country’s population while the Gender Inequality Index 
exposes differences in the distribution of achievements between men and women. 
Income inequalities are linked to and can reinforce other inequalities such as education 
and health inequality [44]. There is a relationship between high inequality and weak 
growth in developing countries, where a large part of population is trapped in poverty. 
Furthermore the data show [43] that countries with unequal distribution of human 
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development within the nation also experience high inequality between women and men. 
So, the Inequality and Development & deprivation components together help point out 
how the average person is doing and overcome the assumption that if the whole is 
growing, everyone must be doing better. 
4.3.3.5 Component: Aid dependency 
With the Aid dependency component, the methodology points out the countries that 
lack sustainability in development growth due to economic instability and humanitarian 
crisis. It is comprised of two indicators: Public aid per capita and net official development 
assistance (ODA) received in percentage of gross national income (GNI) by the World 
Bank. 
Public aid per capita is obtained as a sum of total official development assistance in the 
last 2 years per capita published by OECD and Global Humanitarian Funding per capita 
published by UN OCHA. 
Official development assistance (22) has the promotion of economic development and 
welfare as its main objective. The effects of the economic instability are the main source 
of growth regression [44] because it decreases the ability of governments to predict 
budget revenue and thus expenditure, but also has an impact on income in dependent 
households. And once progress on human development is reversed, the damage can 
have multiplier effects and be lasting. For instance, deteriorating health and education 
today can lead to higher mortality rates tomorrow. Lower investments can hamper future 
progress in sanitation and water supply. The presence of fewer children in school can 
lead to lower completion rates in later years. And household incomes that fall far below 
the poverty line can delay escapes from poverty. 
In a very simplistic view, the poorest regions on the world receive the highest volume of 
development aid relative to other regions [44]. These are the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa and other least developed countries based on HDI ranking. So, development aid 
flows can cause developing countries to maintain government spending. 
Parallel to the Aid dependency component other aspects of economic dependency were 
considered as well, such as Export dependency (the ratio of the international trade to 
GDP), Export concentration (a degree to which a country’s export is concentrated on a 
small number of products or a small number of trading partners) and Personal 
remittances received (in % of GDP). They would address economic vulnerability in a 
country as a risk to have its development hampered by financial shocks triggered by 
different events on the foreign markets. Finally, they were not adopted due to a weak 
causal link with the humanitarian risk. 
4.3.4 Category: Vulnerable groups 
4.3.4.1 Definition 
The Vulnerable group category refers to the population within a country that has specific 
characteristics that make it at a higher risk of needing humanitarian assistance than 
others or being excluded from financial and social services. In a crisis situation such 
groups would need extra assistance, which appeals for additional measures, i.e. extra 
capacity, as a part of the emergency phase of disaster management. 
Why are certain groups of people more vulnerable than others? At a conceptual level two 
fundamental reasons of increased vulnerability can be identified: 
● Intrinsic due to internal qualities of individual themselves: 
 Special disabilities; 
 Disease; and 
                                           
(22)  http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
 35 
 Limitations imposed by stages of human life. 
● Extrinsic as a result of external circumstances: 
 Social: ethnic, religious minorities, indigenous peoples; 
 Political: people affected by conflicts; refugees and IDPs; 
 Environmental: people recently exposed to frequent natural hazardous 
events or living in areas difficult to access, like mountainous regions or 
extremely rural areas. 
It is often the case that a particular vulnerable group is prone to several weaknesses as 
one characteristic of increased vulnerability develops circumstances for another one to 
take place. Those specific characteristics bear also a higher risk than others for a need of 
humanitarian assistance in the crisis situation. 
For example, a study of rural communities in North Eastern India [45] shows that 
frequent exposure to floods is associated with long-term malnutrition of children under 
five. The underlying cause is the adverse impacts of flooding on crop productivity. Crop 
yield variation is one of the leading mechanisms to limited access to food. In such 
situations children are the first to suffer because of their greater sensitivity to certain 
exposure and dependence on care givers. 
The vulnerable groups are a weak part of the society also in highly developed countries. 
The Kobe earthquake of M 7.2 in 1997 revealed [22] a particularly vulnerable minority of 
Korean-Japanese workers and foreign illegal and legal workers. They were subjected to 
official neglect and economic deprivation. Within the most severely affected wards of 
Kobe City there were 130 000 foreign and migrant workers. Most were paid low wages in 
small businesses that were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake, which made their 
recovery even more difficult. However, they failed to surface in official reporting by 
government as well as in most NGO reports. 
Furthermore, children, the elderly and women in general are a more vulnerable part of 
the society. Their presence is a demographic characteristic of the country (and in case of 
gender not even country specific), which is why we do not consider them as a special 
vulnerable group. The aim is to address special issues related to them. Children 
underweight indicator considers the group of children that are in a weak health condition, 
while together with child mortality it reflects also efficiency of the country’s health 
system and food access problems. Gender inequality is taken into account under the 
Inequality component in the socioeconomic vulnerability. Regarding older people, they 
are also affected by inadequate health service and lack of protection, issues common to 
older ages. Declining health as well as social (e.g. isolation) and economic 
marginalisation makes them even more vulnerable in disasters and conflicts [46]. 
Physical or mental impairment impede the ability to evacuate or specific health problems 
need adequate health care and medicines or isolation due to forgotten responsibilities of 
relatives and community results in poor nutritional status and poor livelihood conditions 
in general. Globally, the proportion of older people is increasing faster than any other 
group but the number of old people alone or old-age dependency ratio alone is not 
reflecting their weaknesses. Namely, old-age dependency ratio is higher in higher income 
countries but their basic insurance providing basic health care and old age pension 
makes their situation better. Altogether it is the matter of the Lack of coping capacity 
dimension, partially related with the quality of the social and health system, but mainly it 
is about strategies to protect older people during emergencies, which are not 
momentarily directly covered by any available indicators. 
However, effective monitoring and related indicators exist only for some of the identified 
vulnerable groups. 
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4.3.4.2 Vulnerable groups: Components 
The Vulnerable group category (Table 13) is split in two: Uprooted people and Other 
vulnerable groups. Uprooted people are effectively weighted more because they are 
not a part of the society or the social system, are only partially supported by the 
community and often trigger the humanitarian intervention. 
Table 12. Indicators of the Vulnerable groups category 
Component/  
Sub-component 
Indicator Source MIN–MAX No of 
Missing 
values 
Uprooted 
people 
Number of refugees, returned refugees, 
internally displaced persons (absolute) 
UNHCR, IDMC 
Log(1,000)- 
Log(1 000 000) 
- 
Number of refugees, returned refugees, 
internally displaced persons (relative) 
UNCHR, IDMC, 
World Bank 
0.005 %-10 % - 
Other 
Vulnerable 
groups/Health 
conditions 
Prevalence of HIV-AIDS above 15 years WHO 0 %-5 % 34/191 
Tuberculosis prevalence WHO 0-550 2/191 
Malaria mortality rate WHO 0-120 90/191 
Other 
Vulnerable 
groups/ 
Children 
under 5 
Children underweight Unicef, WHO 0 %-45 % 60/191 
Child mortality Unicef, WHO 0-130 1/191 
Other 
Vulnerable 
groups/Recent 
shocks 
Relative number of affected population by 
natural disasters in the last three years 
EM-DAT, 
CRED 
0 %-10 % - 
Other 
Vulnerable 
groups/Food 
security 
Prevalence of undernourishment FAO 5 %-35 % 29/191 
Average dietary energy supply adequacy FAO 75 %-150 % 31/191 
Domestic Food Price Level Index FAO 1-2.5 45/191 
Domestic Food Price Volatility Index FAO 0-20 54/191 
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Table 13. Aggregation of the Vulnerable groups category 
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Absolute  
Relative  
  Absolute value of uprooted people 
Uprooted people relative to total population 
 
The Vulnerable groups category should be always fed with the most recent data available 
(e.g. uprooted people, people affected by recent shocks …). 
Scalability: The indicators for the Uprooted people component are foreseen to be 
updated as soon as data are available on subnational scale. The indicators of the Health 
Conditions and the Children under-5 sub-component are updated annually and could be 
potentially provided sub-nationally if the data would exist. The data for the Recent shock 
sub-component are limited to national scale and provided every 3 months. In case of 
Food Security indicators the data are available annually on national scale but other 
options considered in Box 4, not available at the moment globally, would allow 
geographical and temporal disaggregation. 
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4.3.4.3 Component: Uprooted people 
The total number of uprooted people is the sum of the highest figures from the selected 
sources for each uprooted group. The Uprooted people component is the arithmetic 
average of the absolute and relative value of uprooted people. The absolute value is 
presented using the log transformation while the uprooted people relative to the total 
population are transformed into indicator using the GNA criteria and then normalised into 
range from 0 to 10 (Table 14). 
Table 14. Transformation criteria for the relative value of uprooted people 
% of total population Level of 
vulnerability 
Uprooted people 
(relative 
subcomponent) 
> 10 % High  10.0 
> 3 % AND < 10 %   8.3 
> 1 % AND < 3 % Medium  6.7 
> 0.5 % AND < 1 %   5.0 
> 0.1 % AND < 0.5 % Low  3.3 
> 0.005 % AND < 0.1 %   1.7 
< 0.005 % No vulnerability 0.0 
 
4.3.4.4 Component: Other vulnerability groups/Health condition 
A Health condition subcomponent refers to people in a weak health conditions. It is 
calculated as the arithmetic average of the indicators for three deadly infectious diseases, 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, which are considered as pandemics of low- and middle-
income countries. The combat against these three diseases is one of the 2015 Millennium 
Development Goals (23) and the Sustainable Development Goals (24). Similarly, the 
Global Fund (25) is an international financing institution that fights AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria. 
4.3.4.5 Component: Other vulnerability groups/Children under 5 
A Children under-5 subcomponent captures the health condition of children. It is 
referred to with two indicators, malnutrition and mortality of children under 5. Children 
Underweight extracts the group of children that are in a weak health condition mainly 
due to hunger. Child mortality shows general health condition of the children and is 
closely linked to maternal health since more than one third of children deaths occur 
within the first month of life and to how well the country tackles major childhood 
diseases (e.g. proper nutrition, vaccinations, monitoring system, family care practice, 
health system access, sanitation and water resources). Therefore, decrease of 
underweight children and the child deaths are one of the MDG by 2015 as well. 
4.3.4.6 Component: Other vulnerability groups/Recent shocks 
Recent shocks subcomponent accounts for increased vulnerability during the recovery 
period after a disaster and considers people affected by natural disasters in the past 
3 years. The affected people from the most recent year are considered fully while 
affected people from the previous years are scaled down with the factor 0.5 and 0.25 for 
the second and third year, respectively, assuming that recovery decreases vulnerability 
progressively. This way the smoothness of the INFORM index in time series is assured. 
                                           
(23) https://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx 
(24) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs 
(25)  http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/  
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4.3.4.7 Component: Other vulnerability groups/Food security 
The FAO definition of food security is: ‘A situation that exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (26). 
For our model, we therefore suggest that the Food security subcomponent is dependent 
on Food access, Food availability, and Food utilisation. This concept serves as a set of 
proxy measures for the number of people lacking secure access to food. Leaning on 
definitions provided by the Integrated Phased Food Security Classification (IPC), we 
determine Food availability on whether food is actually or potentially physically present 
regarding production, wild foods, food reserves, markets, and transportation. Food 
access assesses whether or not households have sufficient access to that food, taking 
into account physical (distance, infrastructure), financial (purchasing power) and social 
(ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, etc.) aspects. Finally, Food utilisation covers the 
question as to whether or not households are sufficiently utilising food in terms of food 
preferences, preparation, feeding practices, storage and access to improved water 
sources. 
The combination of lack of food, lack of means to actually make it available, and lacking 
quality of food may lead to famine and hunger for poor populations. Therefore, the three 
components are aggregated with an arithmetic average. All components are the 
arithmetic average of the raw indicators. In the Food access component more weight is 
given to the price index (absolute) versus price volatility, 80 % versus 20 %, 
respectively. For example, there are some situations of countries with high but stable 
prices that seem better off than countries with average prices and average volatility. 
Box 4. Other options for food insecurity sub-component 
For the Food security sub-component some other options were considered, which seem 
more adequate but their coverage was too sparse: 
— The IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) classifies the severity of food 
security and humanitarian situations into five phases based on a widely accepted set 
of indicators. The phase classification describes the current situation for a given area, 
while also communicating the likelihood and severity of further deterioration of the 
situation. 
— The FEWSNet (27) methodology used by a famine early warning systems network. It 
uses scenarios to forecast the most likely outcomes based on continuous monitoring 
of weather, climate, agriculture, production, prices, trade, and other factors, 
considered together with an understanding of local livelihoods. 
These options may be integrated in the INFORM methodology in the future, when data 
coverage increases. 
  
                                           
(26)  http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4030e.pdf, p. 50. The complementary definition for food insecurity is: ‘A situation 
that exists when people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal 
growth and development and an active and healthy life. It may be caused by the unavailability of food, 
insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution or inadequate use of food at the household level. 
Food insecurity, poor conditions of health and sanitation and inappropriate care and feeding practices are 
the major causes of poor nutritional status. Food insecurity may be chronic, seasonal or transitory’ (ibid.). 
(27)  http://www.fews.net 
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4.4 Dimension: Lack of coping capacity 
4.4.1 Overview 
For the Lack of coping capacity dimension, the question is, which issues the government 
has addressed to increase the resilience of the society and how successful their 
implementation is. The Lack of coping capacity dimension measures the ability of a 
country to cope with disasters in terms of formal, organised activities and the effort of 
the country’s government as well as the existing infrastructure, which contribute to the 
reduction of disaster risk. 
Box 5. Variations in the subnational models: Lack of coping capacity 
An INFORM Subnational model uses the same risk assessment methodology and 
development process, but is adapted to regional or national level (28). 
The most important changes in Lack of coping capacity dimension include the addition of 
Financial and economic system (East Africa), International investments in risk reduction 
(Sahel, East Africa). 
4.4.2 Lack of coping capacity: categories 
It is aggregated by a geometric mean of two categories: Institutional and Infrastructure. 
The difference between the categories is in the stages of the disaster management cycle 
that they are focusing on. If the Institutional category covers the existence of DRR 
programmes, which address mostly mitigation and preparedness/early warning phase, 
then the Infrastructure category measures the capacity for emergency response and 
recovery. 
                                           
(28)  INFORM Guidance Note 2016 (http://www.inform-index.org). 
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Figure 8. Graphical presentation of the Lack of coping capacity dimension 
 
4.4.3 Category: Institutional 
4.4.4 Definition 
The Institutional category quantifies the government’s priorities and institutional basis for 
the implementation of DRR activities. It is calculated as an arithmetic average of two 
components, Disaster risk reduction and Governance (Table 16), in order to 
incorporate the effectiveness of the governments’ effort for building resilience across all 
sectors of society. 
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Table 15. Indicators of the Institutional category 
Component Indicator Source MIN–MAX 
No of 
missing 
values 
Disaster risk 
reduction 
Hyogo Framework for Action self-
assessment reports 
UNISDR 1-5 40/191 
Governance 
Government effectiveness World Bank – 2.5-2.5 - 
Corruption Perception Index 
Transparency 
International 
0-100 17/191 
Table 16. Aggregation of Institutional category 
Category Institutional 
Component 
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE 
Disaster risk reduction Governance 
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Scalability: For all indicators of the Institutional category only annual updates on a 
national scale are possible. 
4.4.4.1 Component: Disaster Risk Reduction 
The indicator for the Disaster Risk Reduction activity in the country comes from the 
score of Hyogo Framework for Action self-assessment reports of the countries. The 
Hyogo Framework for Action [47] covers the following topics: 
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong 
institutional basis for implementation. 
2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. 
3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and 
resilience at all levels. 
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. 
Self-evaluation has a risk of being perceived as a process of presenting inflated grades 
and being unreliable. 
4.4.4.2 Component: Governance 
The subjectivity of HFA Scores is counterweighted by arithmetical average with external 
indicators of Governance component, i.e. the Government Effectiveness and 
Corruption Perception Index. 
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The Government Effectiveness (29) captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies [48] while the Corruption Perception 
Index adds another perspective, that is the level of misuse of political power for private 
benefit, which is not directly considered in the construction of the Government 
Effectiveness even though interrelated. 
4.4.5 Category: Infrastructure 
4.4.5.1 Definition 
Communication networks, physical infrastructure and accessible health systems are 
treated as essential parts of the infrastructure needed during emergency response, 
focusing on the early warning phase, and carrying through response and recovery. Since 
all parts of the infrastructure should be operational to a certain level, the aggregation 
process uses the arithmetic average of indicators describing accessibility as well as the 
redundancy of the concerned system that are two crucial characteristics in a crisis 
situation. 
Table 17. Indicators of the Infrastructure category 
Component Indicator Source MIN–MAX 
No of 
missing 
values 
Communication 
Access to electricity World Bank (30)2-(100)2 1/191 
Internet users World Bank 0 %-100 % 1/191 
Mobile cellular subscriptions World Bank 5-200 - 
Adult literacy rate Unesco 0 %-100 % 42/191 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Roads density OpenStreetMap 1-100 - 
Access to improved water source WHO/Unicef 50 %-100 % 2/191 
Access to improved sanitation facilities WHO/Unicef 10 %-100 % 3/191 
Access to health 
system 
Physicians density WHO 0-4 19/191 
Health expenditure per capita WHO 50-3 000 6/191 
Measles immunisation coverage WHO 60 %-99 % 1/191 
 
                                           
(29)  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc 
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Table 18. Aggregation of the Infrastructure category 
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Component 
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE 
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Scalability: Health expenditure per capita has a unit of analysis locked to country while 
all the other indicators could be potentially developed on subnational scale if the data 
would exist. Regarding the temporal scalability only annual updates are expected. 
4.4.5.2 Component: Communication 
The Communication component aims at measuring the efficiency of dissemination of 
early warnings through a communication network as well as coordination of preparedness 
and emergency activities. It is dependent on the dispersion of the communication 
infrastructure as well as the literacy and education level of the recipients. 
4.4.5.3 Component: Physical infrastructure 
Physical infrastructure component is the arithmetic average of different proxy 
measures. We mainly try to assess the accessibility as well as the redundancy of the 
lifeline systems, which are crucial in a crisis situation, i.e. roads, water and sanitation 
systems. 
4.4.5.4 Component: Access to health system 
Access to health system component is the arithmetic average of different proxy 
measures. We mainly try to assess the accessibility as well as the redundancy of the 
different assets of the existing health systems. 
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5 Limitations and constraints of INFORM 
There are certain areas of the three dimensions of INFORM that are not covered or 
covered only partially. The main constraints are related to limitations of the methodology 
and incomplete data availability. 
5.1 Methodological limitations 
Composite indicator. The composite indicators are simplification of reality. The simple 
‘big picture’ results which composite indicators show may invite politicians to draw 
simplistic policy conclusions. Composite indicators should be used in combination with the 
sub-indicators to draw sophisticated policy conclusions (30). 
Interactions among dimensions are not considered. For example, the measures of 
disaster risk reduction in the Lack of coping capacity dimension might reduce the 
exposure data in the Hazard & exposure dimension. The methodology is not able to 
introduce such interactions in a quantitative manner. 
The usage of proxies limits the ‘representativeness’. Certain phenomena that were 
addressed as important for the humanitarian risk assessment cannot be measured 
exactly in the way we want or adequate indicators are not available. In such situations, 
proxy measures are used which measure something that is close enough to reflect similar 
behaviour and can provide relative differences among the countries for ranking purposes. 
The proper representativeness of phenomena is limited to the presence of causes, 
consequences, measurable parts of the process or even accompanying processes. For 
example, the malaria mortality rate is a proxy used to rank countries by the prevalence 
of malaria as the latter data are deemed unreliable. 
5.2 Data limitations 
Extensive hazardous events and sudden onset hazardous events with a more 
limited geographic extent such as landslides, forest fires and volcanoes, are not 
included. One reason is lack of data availability while the other is their lower relevance 
in terms of causing humanitarian crises. According to the CRED EM-DAT database [22] 
the death toll of natural hazards during 1900-1999 is less than 0.2 % due to volcanic 
eruptions, landslides and wildfires. On the other hand, the rapid onset hazards with a 
more limited geographic extent seldom exceed entry criteria of the EM-DAT database. 
From that point of view their presence in the database is incomplete and the cumulative 
death toll is higher, as one event rarely causes humanitarian crises. 
Biological hazards (i.e. epidemics/large-scale epidemics/pandemics) are not 
included. They can have a large impact not only on mortality and morbidity but also on 
travel and trade as well as socioeconomic effects. To consider their potential threat, the 
data on probability of re-emerging diseases with certain level of impact are needed and 
are not so easily available. WHO and JRC are working to include an infectious disease 
outbreaks component in the natural hazard category of INFORM. 
Technological hazards are not included. Technological hazards originate from 
technological or industrial accidents that may arise as a result of an intentional plan 
(terrorist attack), a random process (human error), natural hazardous event (Natech), or 
the lack of maintenance or ageing processes. The likelihood of such events is partially 
related to the presence of critical assets (uranium tailings, UXO, nuclear power plants, 
chemical plants) in the country and partially to the probability of occurrence of triggering 
event. The list of critical assets (uranium tailings, UXO, nuclear power plants, chemical 
plants) by country is therefore not enough to define the country’s risk. To consider the 
consequences, data with a certain level of impact are needed, for example in terms of 
physical exposure, and each critical asset should come together with impact area not 
constrained by country borders. These data are currently not available. 
                                           
(30)  https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/?q=10-step-guide/step-1-theoretical-framework  
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Lower reliability of disaster risk reduction component. The disaster risk reduction 
component is based on the scores of Hyogo Framework for Action self-assessment 
reports of which the reliability is unknown. Self-assessment reports cover almost 80 % of 
the countries. But it is not a stand-alone indicator and its trustfulness is estimated with 
the governance component. However, at the time being there are no other international 
frameworks for assessing the capacity to cope with humanitarian crises that would fit the 
scope so well [49]. Sendai Framework [47] for development and disaster risk reduction 
aims to provide new indicators to monitor global targets. As soon as they become 
available they will replace the HFA scores within the DRR component. 
Missing data can distort the real value of the composite indicator. The presence of 
missing data cannot be completely avoided. The goal of the composite indicator is to 
aggregate the different aspects of the humanitarian risk. Whenever certain values are 
missing, the aggregation process fails as a tool to compensate a deficit in one dimension 
/category/components by surplus in another. In the case of poor coverage, we 
introduced, whenever available, more than one proxy measure for the same component 
to complement each other. 
Table 19. Countries with more than 20 % of missing values in INFORM 2017 
Country Missing values (% of 
total) 
Liechtenstein 22 (43 %) 
Nauru 15 (29 %) 
Tuvalu 15 (29 %) 
Marshall Islands 14 (27 %) 
Dominica 13 (25 %) 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 13 (25 %) 
Grenada 12 (24 %) 
Korea DPR 12 (24 %) 
Antigua and Barbuda 11 (22 %) 
Eritrea 10 (20 %) 
Kiribati 10 (20 %) 
Micronesia 10 (20 %) 
Palau 10 (20 %) 
Somalia 10 (20 %) 
 
In INFORM 2017 36 countries have all data, while 14 countries have more than 20 % of 
missing values (Table 19). 
Countries in conflict. In countries facing internal conflicts (i.e. Syria, Iraq, Libya), the 
reliability of the data (when available) is normally weak. Therefor the resulting INFORM 
score for those countries has to be taken with caution. 
Limitations in the sensitivity of indicators and data updates affect the 
responsiveness of the INFORM index. Some indicators in the INFORM index are 
designed to reflect the real-time situation but there are time constraints that should be 
kept in mind. Firstly, there is a time lag between a situation changing and the indicator 
reflecting this change and, secondly, the indicators are usually issued with delays 
because they need to go through a validation process. 
Natural hazard category is static. The probability of natural hazard doesn’t change in 
short-medium period, while the population movement is more dynamic. Urbanisation, 
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economical and conflict-induced migration are processes that can change the population 
distribution dramatically. Moreover, vulnerable population is likely to move to the more 
hazard risk areas. The exposure data currently used in INFORM cannot capture the 
described dynamics, but some potential alternatives exist and they will be taken into 
consideration for the next realises. 
5.3 Ranking of countries 
The composite indicator is a simplified view of the reality and the user should be aware of 
its limitations. Understanding humanitarian risk is a complex problem which can be 
referred to as a multidimensional phenomenon. The role of the theoretical framework is 
to specify single dimensions and their interrelations as well as to provide the basis for 
indicator selection. The ranking value of the index is the result of the methodology that 
defines the mathematical combination of individual indicators. Therefore not risk, but risk 
as described by the methodology of the composite indicator could be managed. 
Furthermore, the INFORM index conveys only the information measured by indicators. 
Indicators have to be compliant with the selection criteria (Chapter 4.1) and the choice is 
sometimes more data-driven than user-driven. Different types of indicators are used: 
● Direct measures (e.g. number of uprooted people) which have a strong influence 
on the score; 
● Proxy measures (e.g. Gini index can be a proxy for inequality in education, 
livelihood, health conditions) which serve mainly for ranking; 
● composite indicators (e.g. HDI, MPI …) that can be a combination of both. 
The INFORM index can provide different types of results. One is the ranking of countries. 
This builds a relationship among the countries in terms of ‘a certain country is ranked 
higher or lower than the other’. The other is the score of the countries which can be used 
for following trends in time series. The higher the presence of the direct measures over 
proxies, the larger is the relevance of the scores. For more qualitative assessment the 
countries can be grouped into five classes of very low, low, medium, high and very high 
risk of humanitarian crises. Furthermore, the same results can be gained in the level of 
dimensions and categories (Chapter 7). 
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6 Building the INFORM model 
Before the construction of the composite indicator and sub-indices, all raw data values of 
the core indicators are pre-processed. A pre-processed indicator is referred to as an 
index. 
Pre-processing may include: 
● Imputation of missing values; 
● Transformation into non-dimensional scales, e.g. utilising percentages, per capita 
or density functions; 
● Log transformation; 
● Re-scaling into range 0-10 in combination with min–max normalisation: 
 Outliers identification; 
 Setting min and max values; 
 Inversion of values for the clear communication of the results: the 
higher the worse through all the dimensions, categories and 
components. 
For each core indicator, the pre-processing steps are described in a separate 
document (31). 
6.1 Imputation of missing values 
If data for some countries are not available for a given year, a systematic imputation of 
missing values is using the data from the most recent year available in 5 years span. 
In the case of the missing data due to the weak coverage, the approach is to introduce 
more than one indicator for the same component to complement each other. 
6.2 Transformations 
Transformations are applied whenever it can be justified to change the absolute 
differences among the countries. 
The log transformation is used to reduce the positive skewness of data. Such datasets 
include those where the indicator is based on a people count with certain conditions. The 
log scale gives more weight to the differences between the countries with lower values 
and less weight to the countries with higher values of indicators. Log transformations 
take into account not only the absolute difference between two countries similar in 
performance but also the proportion of the gap compared to the real value of the 
indicator. The same gap on the lower side of the range is more important than being on 
the upper side of the rank. Therefore, transformed data more clearly differentiate the 
small differences at all ranges of performance and improve the interpretation of 
differences between the countries on opposite ends of ranking. 
6.3 Normalisation 
Re-scaling normalises indicators to have an identical range of 0.0-10.0 with the notion 
that higher is worse. The normalised indicators have been rounded to the first decimal 
place. As outliers often cause min and max values to be very different from the bulk of 
the values in the dataset rescaling with predefined min and max values is applied 
(Equation 2). 
Identification of outliers and setting min and max values. Fixed min and max 
values for each indicator dataset are preferred in order to: 
                                           
(31) Data Factsheet (http://www.inform-index.org/Results/Global). 
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● preserve the rescaling factor and make the transformation stable through the time 
series; 
● exclude the distortion effect of outliers on indicator’s set; 
● consider the nature of the topic reflected which predefines the reasonable min and 
max values (e.g. expert opinion). 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑗 =
𝑥𝑖
𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
× 10 
Equation 2 
𝑥𝑖
𝑗
           − 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛       − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
′𝑠  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑎𝑥      − 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
′𝑠  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝑥𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑗
−  𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 
An outlier is a data point that is distinctly separate from the rest of the data. Outliers are 
indicative of heavy-tailed distribution, a mixture of two distributions, or errors. In the 
first two cases they indicate that the distribution has high kurtosis and skewness or may 
be two distinct sub-populations, then one should be very cautious in using tools or 
intuitions that assume a normal distribution. In the case of errors one wishes to discard 
them or use statistics that are robust to outliers. There are many techniques to identify 
outliers, but in INFORM index a combination of the following two has been used: 
● Box plot [44] based on interquartile range (IQR) where the lowest datum is still 
within 1.5 IQR of the lower quartile, and the highest datum is still within 1.5 IQR 
of the upper quartile and the rest of the data are treated as outliers. This 
approach focuses on the range containing 50 % of the countries and then extends 
that range independently from the distribution. So the number of data points that 
exceeds the limits varies. For right-skewed distributions the boxplot typically 
labels too many large outliers and too few small outliers. 
● Anomalous values of skewness and kurtosis: the min and max values for which 
skewness is lower than 2 AND kurtosis is lower than 3.5 (32). Skewness and 
kurtosis are calculated iteratively for the whole dataset without the obvious 
outliers, until pre-set conditions are met. The minimum and maximum data point 
of the remaining dataset are taken as min and max. 
The two technics were used to find the indicative min and max values based on data 
from 2008-2013. They were adjusted to cover expected changes (beyond 2013) over 
time based on expert opinion. The min and max values will be re-evaluate periodically, 
e.g. every 5 years. 
Inversion. The methodology defines in what way single indicator affects the composite 
indicator. In the model all values are presented with the notion that higher is worse. So, 
whenever higher values of the indicator would contribute to a lower INFORM index, the 
following inversion of already rescaled dataset, is executed: 
                                           
(32) Saisana, M., 13th JRC Annual Training on Composite Indicators & Scoreboards, 12-13/11/2015, Ispra (IT), 
Joint Research Centre. 
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 𝑥𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑣
𝑗 = 10 −  𝑥𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑗
 Equation 3 
𝑥𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑗
       − 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝑥𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑣
𝑗
 − 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑  
6.4 Aggregation 
Different aggregation rules are possible. Which one to choose depends on the 
methodology [52] which defines how the information from indicators should contribute to 
the composite indicator. Aggregation rules can be defined using mathematical operations 
such as: 
● Minimum: the best indicator only 
● Maximum: the worst indicator only 
● Arithmetic average 
● Geometric average 
The INFORM methodology implements the arithmetic and geometric average. 
Aggregation rules are applied to indexes at each level in order to progress through the 
levels in a hierarchical bottom-up way, i.e. starting at indicator level and going one by 
one through the component level, the category level, to the dimension level. The final 
score of the INFORM index is calculated with the risk equation (Equation 1) in 
Chapter 2.2. 
In arithmetic and geometric aggregations weighting can be applied to control the 
contribution of each indicator to the overall composite and should be justified by the 
theoretical framework. Practically, weights express a desired trade-off between 
indicators. 
Box 6. Arithmetic vs. geometric average 
For ranking purposes, aggregation is a tool to compensate a deficit in one dimension by 
surplus in another. With arithmetic average compensation is constant while with 
geometric average compensation is lower and rewards more the indicators with higher 
scores (33). For a country with high and low scores, an equal improvement for low scores 
will have a much greater effect on the aggregation score than an equal improvement in 
the high score. So, the country should focus in those sectors with the lowest score if it 
wants to improve its position in ranking in case of the geometric aggregation. 
                                           
(33)  The geometric average is always smaller or equal than the arithmetic average. To use that characteristic of 
geometric average, i.e. to reward more those countries with high scores, the following procedure was 
applied [16]: 
1. Inversion of index following the notion higher the better. 
2. Rescaling of index into the range [1,10]. 
3. Calculation of geometric average. 
4. Rescaling the score back into the range [0,10]. 
5. Inversion of the score with the notion that higher is worse. 
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To provide an understanding of the implication of using either average, let us consider 
the Hazard & exposure dimension which is aggregated by two categories with equal 
weights, Natural and Human hazard. For example, we consider Ethiopia and Nigeria. 
These two countries have almost equal arithmetic average in those two categories. 
However, arithmetic average implies that in order to have a high score in the Hazard & 
exposure dimension, then both the Natural and the Human hazard category have to be 
high. Instead, the use of a geometric average implies that it is enough for a country to 
have a high score either on the Natural or on the Human hazard category, in order for 
the country to have a high Hazard & exposure score. As a high exposure in at least one 
of the hazard categories already put the country at high risk of exposure to hazards, it is 
more logical to use geometric average. 
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7 Interpretation of the INFORM index score 
The INFORM index is scored between 0.0 and 10.0. The low values of the index represent 
a positive performance, and the high values of the index represent a negative 
performance in terms of managing humanitarian risk. The notion that higher is the worse 
is consistently applied also at dimension, category and component level. 
For the better perception of risk, the countries were sorted into different clusters based 
on their score/scores from the past 5 years. The scope of the fixed threshold obtained 
from the clustering analysis on the 5 years of historical data is: 
● more meaningful trend analysis; 
● more solid perception of risk classes among users. 
The previous quartile approach in INFORM 2015 to define four classes of risk has many 
drawbacks: 
● Constant number of countries within the classes; 
● Change of the class doesn’t imply improvement in score; 
● The transitions among classes based on the performance was not allowed. 
In this section, we describe the new approach introduced in INFORM 2016 to cluster 
countries, and provide a guide to interpretation of the scores. 
7.1 Cluster analysis 
Clustering is finding groups in a dataset by some natural criterion of similarity (34). This is 
also the common objective of many different cluster algorithm (35). In INFORM the 
hierarchical clustering model was used. Hierarchical clustering models also called 
connectivity based clustering were among the earliest techniques developed. They are 
based on the idea that the objects are more related to nearby objects than those further 
away. Clusters are thus developed based on distance between objects in the data space. 
The idea is to build a binary tree of the data that successively merges similar groups. 
Each level of the resulting tree is a segmentation of data. There is no single partitioning 
provided, but rather a hierarchy of clusters which expand or decrease in number solely 
based on distance measure and linkage criterion without the need to know the number of 
clusters in advance. 
In the case of INFORM, Ward’s minimum variance criterion was applied. This is an 
agglomerative hierarchical clustering procedure (bottom up approach) where the criterion 
for choosing the pair of clusters to merge at each step is based on minimum increase in 
total within-cluster variance after merging. At the initial step, all clusters are singletons 
(clusters containing a single object). To apply a recursive algorithm with this criterion, 
the initial distance between individual objects must be squared Euclidean distance. This 
was implemented using hcluster function in R. 
7.2 Fixed 5 risk classes 
It was decided to fix the threshold for five classes (Table 20) within each category (6), 
each dimension (3) and the final INFORM risk score (1) based on all data for the last 
5 years (2012-2016). 10 datasets were assembled with five values for each of 191 
countries. Data within each dataset are grouped into five classes. Dealing with 
1-dimensional data the output of the cluster analysis for each dataset are five intervals 
                                           
(34)  Estivill-Castro, V. (20 June 2002), ‘Why so many clustering algorithms — A Position Paper’, ACM SIGKDD 
Explorations Newsletter 4 (1): 65-75 (doi:10.1145/568574.568575). 
(35)  Clustering algorithms can be categorised based on their cluster model. Some typical cluster models are 
hierarchy, centroid, distribution and density clustering. There are possibly over 100 published clustering 
algorithms. The most appropriate clustering model for a particular problem often needs to be chosen 
experimentally, unless there is a mathematical reason to prefer one cluster model over another. 
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with defined thresholds. The thresholds were rounded generally at the first decimal while 
for the final risk score the thresholds were rounded to 0.5. Next, in the category of 
Human hazard the thresholds for the very high and high risk of conflict were adjusted to 
correspond to the meaning of the initial definitions of conflict risk score (Table 8). It is 
foreseen to keep the same thresholds for at least 5 years. 
There were two reasons to pass from four classes in the previous releases to five classes 
(Table 20): 
● To have a balanced scale of risk assessment; 
● To have manageable size of the classes. 
The whole purpose of risk classification in the form of a hierarchical scale is to 
systematically identify risk in a consistent manner. Risk classes give greater ability to 
monitor, control and even manage risk because it helps to identify the root causes of risk 
in better way. It might be that a similarity-based approach to risk classification is 
inherently ambiguous. As it is open to more than one interpretation we believe it makes 
sense for each organisation to describe the risk classes according to the goals of the 
organisation and the risk management decision that they face. In most cases the users 
will find it useful to look at the classes within specific dimension or even categories (Table 
21 and Table 22). 
Table 20. The labels of the five risk classes 
Level Risk class 
Number of countries 
(INFORM 2017) 
1 Very high 14 
2 High 35 
3 Medium 50 
4 Low 59 
5 Very low 33 
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Table 21. Fixed thresholds at the level of 
dimensions 
 
Table 22. Fixed thresholds at the level of 
categories 
 
7.3 Trends 
Due to fixed threshold the countries can in the future change the class based on their 
performance. As there are many global proactive initiatives to improve the disaster risk 
management at a national level most probably the number of the countries within the 
very high/high risk cluster will be decreasing. On the other hand increased exposure and 
increased hazard probability due to climate change would increase the number of 
countries in the very high/high risk cluster. 
INFORM results are always available for at least 5 years, making it easy to analyse risk 
trends (36). The historical results are back calculated using the same methodology and 
data source of the published release. 
                                           
(36) http://www.inform-index.org/Results/Global 
CLASSES THRESHOLDS IN INFORM 
Dimension CLASS MAX MIN 
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low 2.6 1.5 
very low 1.4 0.0 
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low 3.2 2.0 
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very high 10.0 7.4 
high 7.3 6.0 
medium 5.9 4.7 
low 4.6 3.2 
very low 3.1 0.0 
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Category CLASS MAX MIN 
N
A
TU
R
A
L 
very high 10.0 6.9 
high 6.8 4.7 
medium 4.6 2.8 
low 2.7 1.3 
very low 1.2 0.0 
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very high 10.0 9.0 
high 8 7 
medium 6.9 3.1 
low 3.0 1.0 
very low 0.9 0.0 
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high 7.0 5.4 
medium 5.3 3.5 
low 3.4 1.8 
very low 1.7 0.0 
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very high 10.0 6.3 
high 6.2 4.4 
medium 4.3 2.9 
low 2.8 1.6 
very low 1.5 0.0 
IN
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L very high 10.0 7.3 
high 7.2 6.0 
medium 5.9 4.9 
low 4.8 3.3 
very low 3.2 0.0 
IN
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U
C
TU
R
E
 very high 10.0 7.4 
high 7.3 5.4 
medium 5.3 3.5 
low 3.4 2.1 
very low 2.0 0.0 
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Figure 9. Dynamics of the classes sizes through last 5 years 
 
Limitation of the trend data. The natural hazard category is kept constant over the 
5 years. In order to have continuous data for the all 5 years, the most recent values have 
been used to cover missing values for the previous years (e.g. in the HFA some countries 
started reporting very recently, and there are cases where exist data for 2013 but not for 
previous year). 
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Table 24. Statistical influences of the INFORM categories within dimensions 
 
Hazard & 
exposure 
Vulnerability 
Lack of 
coping 
capacity 
INFORM 
 CC2 Norm CC2 Norm CC2 Norm CC2 Norm 
Natural 50 % 0.51 0.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human 50 % 0.76 0.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-economic 50 % 
 
 0.69 0.49 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerable groups 50 % 
 
 0.71 0.51 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 50 % 
 
 
 
 0.81 0.48 
 
 
Infrastructure 50 % 
 
 
 
 0.89 0.52 
 
 
Hazard & exposure 33 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.63 0.32 
Vulnerability 33 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.73 0.37 
Lack of coping capacity 33% 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.62 0.31 
CC — Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
Norm — Normalised influence 
 
Correlation analysis reveals bivariate (i.e. pairwise) Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
between the indexes (i.e. variables), positioned in the same level or different levels of 
the composite index structure (Table 23). A lack of correlation among the sub-indices of 
the same component/category/dimension, that is the indices within the same level, is a 
useful property. It indicates that they are measuring different ‘statistical dimensions’ in 
data. The less they are correlated the more variables are needed to explain the same 
level of the variance. The covariance of indices may be further investigated via factor 
analysis (38). How many ‘factors’ should be retained in the composite index without losing 
too much information can be decided by, among others, variance explained criteria [52]. 
Usually the rule is to keep enough factors to account for 90 % of the variation. This is the 
way to reduce the number of variables by finding dominant ones within the full set. 
A square of a Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the sub-indices and one-level-up 
aggregate index (component/category/dimension) can measure the influence of sub-
index on the aggregate index due to correlation [53]. The relative differences among 
those correlations explain the influence of a given sub-index for the aggregate index. In 
weighted arithmetic or geometric average (including the case of equal weights), nominal 
weights are defined by the methodology. However the relative influence of indices for the 
aggregated index depends on their distribution after normalisation as well as their 
correlation structure. So, it can be the case that the nominal weighting scheme of the 
composite index does not reflect the statistical importance of individual indices within the 
structure. In that case is good practice to adjust the weighting scheme. 
 
                                           
(38) An extended statistical audit will be performed in 2017 by JRC, and will be published separately. 
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Table 25. Statistical influences of the underlying components 
 
N
a
tu
r
a
l 
H
u
m
a
n
 
S
o
c
io
-
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 
V
u
ln
e
r
a
b
il
it
y
 
V
u
ln
e
r
a
b
le
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
I
n
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
I
n
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
r
e
 
CC2 Norm CC2 Norm CC2 Norm CC2 Norm CC2 Norm CC2 Norm 
Earthquakes 20 % 0.53 0.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tsunamis 20 % 0.21 0.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Floods 20 % 0.55 0.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tropical cyclones 20 % 0.27 0.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Droughts 20 % 0.12 0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current highly violent  
conflict 50 %  
 0.74 0.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict probability 
50 %  
 0.87 0.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development & 
deprivation 50 %  
 
 
 0.86 0.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inequality 25 % 
 
 
 
 0.56 0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aid dependency 25 % 
 
 
 
 0.60 0.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uprooted people 50 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.84 0.71 
 
 
 
 
Other vulnerable 
groups 50 %  
 
 
 
 
 0.34 0.29 
 
 
 
 
DRR 50 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.76 0.48 
 
 
Governance 50 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.82 0.52 
 
 
Communication 33 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.87 0.33 
Physical infrastructure 
33 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.87 0.33 
Access to health care 
33 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.86 0.33 
CC — Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
Norm — Normalised influence 
 
The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Table 24 and Table 25. Similar 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients (always squared) of the categories within the same 
dimension justifies the equal weighting imposed in the INFORM methodology (Table 24). 
The higher influence of the Vulnerability dimension and the Lack of coping capacity 
dimension compared to the Hazard  exposure dimension is appreciated in order to 
increase the sensitivity of the composite index to the indicator that can be most 
influenced by DRR activities. So, dimensions and categories of the composite index are 
well structured and balanced. 
For the lower levels (Table 25) results suggest that all underlying components contribute 
in a similar way to the variation of the aggregated score of the next level. Within the 
Socio-Economic vulnerability category, the Development & deprivation component has a 
stronger influence as intended through a double nominal weight. Within the Human 
68 
hazard category, the normalised influences of the Current highly violent conflict and 
Conflict probability are well balanced. So, the overall index is well-structured and 
balanced in the underlying components. 
The results of the correlation analysis are time-dependent and will change with updated 
datasets. 
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Annex 2. Core indicators 
 
N. Name of core indicator Position in the INFORM model 
1 Physical exposure to earthquake MMI VI (absolute) 
Earthquake 
Natural 
H
az
ar
d
 &
 E
xp
o
su
re
 
2 Physical exposure to earthquake MMI VI (relative) 
3 Physical exposure to earthquake MMI VIII (absolute) 
4 Physical exposure to earthquake MMI VIII (relative) 
5 Physical exposure to tsunamis (absolute) 
Tsunami 
6 Physical exposure to tsunamis (relative) 
7 Physical exposure to flood (absolute) 
Flood 
8 Physical exposure to flood (relative) 
9 Physical exposure to surge from tropical cyclone (absolute) 
Tropical Cyclone 
10 Physical exposure to surge from tropical cyclone (relative) 
11 Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of SS 1 (absolute) 
12 Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of SS 1 (relative) 
13 Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of SS 3 (absolute) 
14 Physical exposure to tropical cyclone of SS 3 (relative) 
15 People affected by droughts (absolute) 
Drought 
16 People affected by droughts (relative) 
17 Frequency of Drought events 
18 Agriculture Drought probability 
19 GCRI Violent Internal Conflict probability 
Projected Conflict Risk 
Human 
20 GCRI High Violent Internal Conflict probability 
21 Current National Power Conflict Intensity 
Current Conflicts Intensity 
22 Current Subnational Conflict Intensity 
23 Human Development Index 
Poverty & Development 
Socio-Economic 
Vulnerability 
V
u
ln
e
ra
b
ili
ty
 
24 Multidimensional Poverty Index 
25 Gender Inequality Index 
Inequality 
26 Gini Coefficient 
27 Public Aid per capita 
Aid Dependency 
28 Net ODA Received (% of GNI) 
29 Total Persons of Concern (absolute) 
Uprooted people 
Vulnerable 
Groups 
30 Total Persons of Concern (relative) 
31 Children Underweight Other Vulnerable Groups 
Children under-5 32 Child Mortality 
33 Prevalence of HIV-AIDS above 15years 
Other Vulnerable Groups 
Health Conditions 
34 Tuberculosis prevalence 
35 Malaria mortality rate 
36 
Relative number of affected population by natural disasters in the 
last three years 
Other Vulnerable Groups 
Recent Shocks 
37 Prevalence of undernourishment 
Other Vulnerable Groups 
Food Security 
38 Average dietary supply adequacy 
39 Domestic Food Price Level Index 
40 Domestic Food Price Volatility Index  
41 Hyogo Framework for Action DRR implementation 
Institutional 
La
ck
 o
f 
C
o
p
in
g 
C
ap
ac
it
y 
42 Government effectiveness 
Governance 
43 Corruption Perception Index 
44 Access to electricity (% of population) 
Communication 
Infrastructure 
45 Internet Users (per 100 people) 
46 Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)  
47 Adult literacy rate 
48 Road density (km of road per 100 sq. km of land area) 
Physical Connectivity 49 Access to Improved water source (% of pop with access) 
50 Access to Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access) 
51 Physicians density 
Access to health system 52 Health expenditure per capita  
53 Measles immunization coverage 
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Annex 3. INFORM 2017 results — countries by alphabetic order 
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Afghanistan AFG 6.2 10.0 8.8 6.6 7.5 7.1 7.3 8.1 7.7 7.8 4 3.9 
Albania ALB 5.8 0.1 3.5 2.0 0.7 1.4 5.8 2.7 4.4 2.8 120 2.2 
Algeria DZA 4.1 6.7 5.5 3.1 3.4 3.3 4.9 4.6 4.8 4.4 62 2.6 
Angola AGO 2.1 5.4 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.4 6.6 7.4 7.0 4.9 50 3.6 
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 2.7 0.6 1.7 1.8 0.9 1.4 5.3 2.0 3.8 2.1 145 4.2 
Argentina ARG 3.5 2.4 3.0 1.6 1.1 1.4 5.0 2.2 3.7 2.5 135 3.3 
Armenia ARM 4.4 2.4 3.5 2.1 3.7 2.9 6.7 2.4 4.9 3.7 91 2.1 
Australia AUS 6.0 0.1 3.6 0.6 2.6 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.3 141 2.9 
Austria AUT 2.4 0.0 1.3 0.8 3.5 2.3 2.1 1.0 1.6 1.7 164 2.1 
Azerbaijan AZE 4.5 5.5 5.0 1.4 6.5 4.4 6.4 2.6 4.8 4.7 58 2.6 
Bahamas BHS 3.6 0.0 2.0 2.3 0.9 1.6 3.3 2.5 2.9 2.1 145 3.2 
Bahrain BHR 0.1 2.5 1.4 1.8 0.9 1.4 4.1 1.2 2.8 1.8 161 3.3 
Bangladesh BGD 8.3 6.5 7.5 3.7 5.6 4.7 5.0 5.9 5.5 5.8 24 1.3 
Barbados BRB 2.5 0.0 1.3 1.9 0.5 1.2 2.7 2.1 2.4 1.6 170 2.7 
Belarus BLR 2.3 2.0 2.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 4.6 1.4 3.2 2.0 153 3.3 
Belgium BEL 1.6 5.1 3.5 0.6 2.7 1.7 2.3 0.7 1.5 2.1 145 2.2 
Belize BLZ 5.2 0.1 3.0 3.0 1.5 2.3 6.3 4.0 5.3 3.3 105 2.4 
Benin BEN 1.5 3.9 2.8 5.8 2.0 4.2 5.9 7.8 7.0 4.4 62 1.8 
Bhutan BTN 3.2 0.1 1.8 4.2 1.2 2.8 4.3 5.1 4.7 2.9 114 2.1 
Bolivia BOL 3.8 5.4 4.6 3.4 1.7 2.6 6.0 4.8 5.4 4.0 80 2.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 4.2 3.4 3.8 2.3 5.3 4.0 6.1 2.4 4.5 4.1 74 2.5 
Botswana BWA 2.7 0.1 1.5 4.1 2.9 3.5 4.9 4.6 4.8 2.9 114 2.0 
Brazil BRA 3.7 5.5 4.7 2.5 1.6 2.1 5.1 3.0 4.1 3.4 100 1.7 
Brunei Darussalam BRN 2.3 0.1 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.8 4.7 4.2 4.5 1.7 164 4.1 
Bulgaria BGR 3.4 1.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.3 4.3 1.7 3.1 2.6 131 2.8 
Burkina Faso BFA 2.8 5.3 4.2 7.3 4.9 6.2 4.7 7.4 6.2 5.4 32 2.4 
Burundi BDI 3.0 8.0 6.1 6.9 5.8 6.4 6.1 6.7 6.4 6.3 16 3.9 
Cabo Verde CPV 1.9 0.1 1.0 6.1 1.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.1 2.5 135 2.0 
Cambodia KHM 5.4 4.2 4.8 4.1 1.7 3.0 7.0 6.0 6.5 4.5 59 2.2 
Cameroon CMR 2.3 9.0 6.8 4.9 6.5 5.8 4.8 6.9 6.0 6.2 18 2.7 
Canada CAN 4.9 0.6 3.0 0.8 3.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 135 2.9 
Central African Republic CAF 1.7 10.0 7.9 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.2 9.1 8.7 8.4 3 4.0 
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Chad TCD 3.7 9.0 7.2 6.9 7.5 7.2 7.9 9.6 8.9 7.7 5 2.6 
Chile CHL 6.6 1.3 4.5 2.3 1.5 1.9 3.1 2.6 2.9 2.9 114 1.8 
China CHN 7.9 5.5 6.9 1.8 3.6 2.7 3.9 3.5 3.7 4.1 74 2.3 
Colombia COL 6.5 7.0 6.8 2.7 7.8 5.8 4.4 3.7 4.1 5.4 32 2.2 
Comoros COM 2.6 0.6 1.7 5.8 2.6 4.4 7.9 5.8 7.0 3.7 91 4.1 
Congo COG 2.5 5.5 4.2 3.9 5.5 4.8 7.5 7.1 7.3 5.3 37 1.8 
Congo DR COD 3.3 8.0 6.2 6.3 7.6 7.0 7.8 8.1 8.0 7.0 8 2.3 
Costa Rica CRI 6.3 0.1 3.8 2.8 1.7 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9 114 1.8 
Côte d’Ivoire CIV 2.0 6.0 4.3 5.5 5.8 5.7 7.3 7.6 7.5 5.7 26 1.8 
Croatia HRV 5.0 0.7 3.1 1.5 0.9 1.2 4.4 1.4 3.0 2.2 142 2.2 
Cuba CUB 5.6 1.1 3.7 2.7 0.2 1.5 3.9 2.2 3.1 2.6 131 3.0 
Cyprus CYP 3.0 0.6 1.9 1.3 6.6 4.5 3.3 1.6 2.5 2.8 120 2.3 
Czech Republic CZE 2.1 0.1 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.1 3.1 1.0 2.1 1.4 175 2.0 
Denmark DNK 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 2.9 1.7 2.0 0.8 1.4 1.1 184 2.0 
Djibouti DJI 4.9 3.2 4.1 5.6 5.8 5.7 6.2 6.7 6.5 5.3 37 3.3 
Dominica DMA 3.6 0.0 2.0 4.1 3.2 3.7 4.6 2.9 3.8 3.0 113 5.6 
Dominican Republic DOM 5.7 2.6 4.3 2.6 1.3 2.0 5.5 3.6 4.6 3.4 100 0.6 
Ecuador ECU 6.8 1.9 4.8 2.4 4.5 3.5 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.2 69 0.7 
Egypt EGY 5.5 7.0 6.3 2.5 4.1 3.3 5.4 3.5 4.5 4.5 59 1.8 
El Salvador SLV 6.1 7.0 6.6 3.7 6.2 5.1 5.4 3.4 4.5 5.3 37 2.8 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 1.5 4.5 3.1 3.8 1.9 2.9 8.0 6.3 7.2 4.0 80 3.2 
Eritrea ERI 4.1 4.3 4.2 5.9 3.5 4.8 8.2 7.5 7.9 5.4 32 3.3 
Estonia EST 0.9 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.0 1.1 3.0 1.0 2.1 1.0 186 2.2 
Ethiopia ETH 4.3 6.6 5.6 6.5 6.9 6.7 4.6 8.4 6.9 6.4 15 1.9 
Fiji FJI 3.8 0.8 2.4 3.7 3.3 3.5 2.9 4.4 3.7 3.1 108 3.2 
Finland FIN 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 2.3 1.5 1.6 0.9 1.3 0.6 189 2.2 
France FRA 3.8 1.5 2.7 0.9 3.9 2.5 2.8 1.1 2.0 2.4 139 1.9 
Gabon GAB 1.9 5.0 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.8 6.6 5.4 6.0 3.9 83 1.8 
Gambia GMB 2.2 1.1 1.7 6.3 3.5 5.1 4.9 6.0 5.5 3.6 95 1.9 
Georgia GEO 4.5 2.8 3.7 2.9 5.9 4.6 4.6 2.0 3.4 3.9 83 2.4 
Germany DEU 2.2 0.1 1.2 0.5 4.0 2.4 2.2 0.7 1.5 1.6 170 2.8 
Ghana GHA 2.4 2.6 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 4.4 6.1 5.3 3.6 95 2.1 
Greece GRC 4.7 2.9 3.9 1.5 2.8 2.2 3.6 1.0 2.4 2.7 126 2.1 
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Grenada GRD 0.5 0.1 0.3 3.1 0.5 1.9 5.0 2.4 3.8 1.3 179 3.7 
Guatemala GTM 6.9 4.8 6.0 4.4 5.4 4.9 6.2 5.2 5.7 5.5 31 1.8 
Guinea GIN 2.4 4.2 3.4 5.7 3.8 4.8 6.3 8.4 7.5 5.0 45 1.9 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 2.4 2.2 2.3 7.2 4.5 6.0 8.0 7.6 7.8 4.8 54 2.6 
Guyana GUY 3.1 0.4 1.8 4.2 3.6 3.9 6.3 4.6 5.5 3.4 100 2.6 
Haiti HTI 5.6 5.2 5.4 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.7 7.3 7.5 6.5 14 1.9 
Honduras HND 5.8 3.9 4.9 4.0 5.2 4.6 6.0 4.3 5.2 4.9 50 1.3 
Hungary HUN 3.6 1.8 2.7 1.5 1.7 1.6 2.9 1.1 2.0 2.1 145 1.9 
Iceland ISL 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.0 186 2.6 
India IND 7.9 6.7 7.3 3.9 6.6 5.4 3.8 5.6 4.8 5.7 26 2.7 
Indonesia IDN 7.8 6.6 7.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 4.5 5.1 4.8 4.3 66 1.3 
Iran IRN 7.2 5.3 6.3 2.7 5.5 4.2 5.5 3.7 4.7 5.0 45 2.5 
Iraq IRQ 5.5 9.0 7.7 2.8 8.0 6.0 8.2 5.3 7.0 6.9 10 2.2 
Ireland IRL 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.2 2.2 1.3 1.8 1.3 179 1.9 
Israel ISR 4.3 4.5 4.4 1.2 2.9 2.1 3.3 1.1 2.3 2.8 120 2.5 
Italy ITA 5.0 1.3 3.4 1.0 3.3 2.2 3.7 0.9 2.4 2.6 131 1.7 
Jamaica JAM 3.7 1.1 2.5 2.5 0.9 1.7 4.3 3.5 3.9 2.5 135 3.1 
Japan JPN 8.3 0.6 5.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 153 3.3 
Jordan JOR 3.9 1.5 2.8 3.8 7.7 6.1 5.4 2.6 4.1 4.1 74 2.3 
Kazakhstan KAZ 4.3 1.5 3.0 1.2 0.4 0.8 5.0 2.4 3.8 2.1 145 2.7 
Kenya KEN 4.9 7.0 6.1 4.9 6.7 5.9 5.3 7.3 6.4 6.1 19 3.0 
Kiribati KIR 3.0 0.1 1.7 6.1 2.7 4.6 6.2 5.8 6.0 3.6 95 4.3 
Korea DPR PRK 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 8.8 3.4 6.9 5.6 30 4.0 
Korea Republic of KOR 5.2 1.8 3.7 0.8 0.4 0.6 2.5 1.3 1.9 1.6 170 2.8 
Kuwait KWT 2.3 0.4 1.4 2.4 0.9 1.7 5.2 1.4 3.5 2.0 153 2.0 
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 5.9 3.2 4.7 3.0 1.0 2.1 5.4 3.4 4.5 3.5 98 1.6 
Lao PDR LAO 4.7 2.9 3.9 4.2 2.0 3.2 6.4 6.0 6.2 4.3 66 1.7 
Latvia LVA 2.3 0.2 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.3 3.8 1.6 2.8 1.7 164 2.3 
Lebanon LBN 3.7 7.0 5.6 4.1 8.3 6.7 5.6 2.3 4.1 5.4 32 4.4 
Lesotho LSO 1.9 2.4 2.2 5.5 4.9 5.2 7.1 6.2 6.7 4.2 69 2.0 
Liberia LBR 3.0 2.2 2.6 7.7 4.6 6.4 7.0 8.6 7.9 5.1 43 2.8 
Libya LBY 4.6 10.0 8.4 1.6 6.0 4.1 8.4 3.9 6.7 6.1 19 5.6 
Liechtenstein LIE 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.4 1.0 1.6 0.9 1.3 1.1 184 4.1 
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Lithuania LTU 1.8 0.0 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.2 3.5 1.1 2.4 1.4 175 2.3 
Luxembourg LUX 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.8 0.6 1.2 0.6 189 2.2 
Madagascar MDG 5.9 1.4 4.0 5.3 2.7 4.1 6.1 8.6 7.6 5.0 45 3.2 
Malawi MWI 3.7 1.5 2.7 6.8 5.7 6.3 5.4 7.2 6.4 4.8 54 1.9 
Malaysia MYS 4.8 3.6 4.2 2.3 3.7 3.0 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.4 100 3.1 
Maldives MDV 3.1 0.1 1.7 2.1 0.7 1.4 5.8 1.5 4.0 2.1 145 4.3 
Mali MLI 3.3 7.0 5.4 6.8 5.2 6.1 5.9 7.5 6.8 6.1 19 2.6 
Malta MLT 2.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 2.8 2.2 3.7 0.8 2.4 1.8 161 2.4 
Marshall Islands MHL 2.1 1.1 1.6 7.3 2.0 5.2 7.7 5.2 6.6 3.8 88 5.3 
Mauritania MRT 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.9 7.9 7.0 5.7 26 2.6 
Mauritius MUS 3.4 0.1 1.9 2.9 0.6 1.8 3.5 2.0 2.8 2.1 145 1.6 
Mexico MEX 7.0 9.0 8.2 2.2 3.9 3.1 5.4 3.3 4.4 4.8 54 1.4 
Micronesia FSM 3.0 0.1 1.7 6.5 3.9 5.3 6.0 5.3 5.7 3.7 91 4.5 
Moldova Republic of MDA 3.9 0.4 2.3 2.5 1.3 1.9 6.3 2.5 4.7 2.7 126 1.8 
Mongolia MNG 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.6 3.6 3.1 5.6 4.5 5.1 3.8 88 2.0 
Montenegro MNE 4.0 0.2 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 4.6 2.0 3.4 2.4 139 2.4 
Morocco MAR 4.9 4.1 4.5 3.3 1.9 2.6 5.8 4.1 5.0 3.9 83 2.8 
Mozambique MOZ 5.9 4.6 5.3 7.0 4.7 6.0 4.4 8.2 6.7 6.0 22 2.3 
Myanmar MMR 8.0 7.0 7.5 5.0 6.9 6.0 7.4 5.7 6.6 6.7 12 3.4 
Namibia NAM 4.1 0.4 2.4 4.5 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.9 5.3 3.7 91 2.7 
Nauru NRU 1.4 0.2 0.8 5.6 3.1 4.5 7.2 4.3 5.9 2.8 120 6.4 
Nepal NPL 5.5 5.0 5.3 4.1 5.9 5.1 6.2 5.5 5.9 5.4 32 1.7 
Netherlands NLD 1.9 0.0 1.0 0.4 3.5 2.1 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 175 2.2 
New Zealand NZL 5.2 0.0 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 161 3.1 
Nicaragua NIC 6.6 3.1 5.1 3.6 1.5 2.6 5.9 4.8 5.4 4.2 69 2.5 
Niger NER 4.2 9.0 7.3 7.4 6.5 7.0 6.0 8.9 7.7 7.3 7 1.7 
Nigeria NGA 2.8 9.0 6.9 4.2 6.6 5.5 5.1 7.7 6.6 6.3 16 2.6 
Norway NOR 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.5 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.6 0.7 188 1.8 
Oman OMN 6.2 0.4 3.9 2.1 0.9 1.5 5.0 2.6 3.9 2.8 120 2.2 
Pakistan PAK 7.2 10.0 9.0 3.9 6.7 5.5 5.4 6.0 5.7 6.6 13 1.8 
Palau PLW 3.1 0.1 1.7 4.5 0.8 2.9 6.1 3.4 4.9 2.9 114 5.0 
Palestine PSE 3.2 4.4 3.8 4.3 7.7 6.3 6.0 2.7 4.6 4.8 54 3.8 
Panama PAN 4.9 0.1 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.8 3.3 4.1 3.2 106 1.9 
74 
COUNTRY ISO3 N
a
tu
r
a
l 
H
u
m
a
n
 
H
a
z
a
r
d
 &
 E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
S
o
c
ia
l-
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 V
u
ln
e
r
a
b
il
it
y
 
V
u
ln
e
r
a
b
le
 G
r
o
u
p
s
 
V
u
ln
e
r
a
b
il
it
y
 
I
n
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
I
n
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
r
e
 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
C
o
p
in
g
 C
a
p
a
c
it
y
 
I
N
F
O
R
M
 2
0
1
7
 
R
A
N
K
 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 I
n
d
e
x
 
Papua New Guinea PNG 5.3 3.7 4.5 5.7 5.6 5.7 6.8 8.4 7.7 5.8 24 3.2 
Paraguay PRY 1.9 2.5 2.2 3.7 0.9 2.4 5.4 3.6 4.6 2.9 114 1.6 
Peru PER 7.0 2.5 5.2 2.3 3.3 2.8 4.8 4.3 4.6 4.1 74 1.0 
Philippines PHL 8.4 9.0 8.7 2.6 4.1 3.4 4.6 3.6 4.1 4.9 50 2.0 
Poland POL 2.4 0.4 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.6 4.0 1.3 2.8 1.9 159 1.6 
Portugal PRT 3.6 0.0 2.0 1.5 0.7 1.1 3.0 0.9 2.0 1.6 170 2.1 
Qatar QAT 1.0 2.9 2.0 2.5 0.7 1.6 3.9 0.4 2.3 1.9 159 2.7 
Romania ROU 4.7 1.5 3.3 1.8 1.3 1.6 4.6 2.3 3.5 2.6 131 1.9 
Russian Federation RUS 6.3 5.7 6.0 2.1 4.1 3.2 6.2 2.2 4.5 4.4 62 2.8 
Rwanda RWA 3.2 6.2 4.9 6.5 5.5 6.0 3.9 6.2 5.2 5.3 37 1.9 
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 1.7 0.0 0.9 5.3 0.5 3.3 4.6 2.3 3.5 2.2 142 4.4 
Saint Lucia LCA 1.8 0.3 1.1 1.9 0.5 1.2 4.6 2.7 3.7 1.7 164 3.4 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
VCT 1.0 0.6 0.8 2.7 0.6 1.7 4.1 3.0 3.6 1.7 164 3.6 
Samoa WSM 2.7 0.1 1.5 5.5 0.4 3.4 4.6 3.6 4.1 2.8 120 3.3 
Sao Tome and Principe STP 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.8 1.4 3.3 6.3 4.7 5.6 1.2 182 3.3 
Saudi Arabia SAU 2.6 10.0 8.0 1.8 0.4 1.1 4.7 2.1 3.5 3.1 108 3.5 
Senegal SEN 4.3 4.6 4.5 5.5 3.9 4.8 5.2 6.7 6.0 5.1 43 0.9 
Serbia SRB 4.6 4.8 4.7 1.6 5.9 4.1 5.2 2.3 3.9 4.2 69 1.7 
Seychelles SYC 2.5 0.0 1.3 3.3 0.9 2.2 4.4 2.6 3.6 2.2 142 3.9 
Sierra Leone SLE 2.3 4.6 3.5 7.4 3.3 5.7 5.4 8.5 7.2 5.2 42 1.7 
Singapore SGP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.4 191 3.3 
Slovakia SVK 3.4 0.1 1.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 3.8 1.1 2.6 1.7 164 1.8 
Slovenia SVN 3.8 0.0 2.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 2.2 1.2 1.7 1.4 175 1.7 
Solomon Islands SLB 5.5 0.8 3.5 7.2 1.9 5.1 6.9 6.8 6.9 5.0 45 4.6 
Somalia SOM 6.8 10.0 8.9 9.6 9.2 9.4 9.6 8.6 9.2 9.2 1 7.1 
South Africa ZAF 4.4 4.6 4.5 3.3 4.7 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.3 66 1.5 
South Sudan SSD 3.7 10.0 8.2 9.4 8.5 9.0 8.9 9.4 9.2 8.8 2 4.6 
Spain ESP 4.5 2.8 3.7 1.1 1.4 1.3 2.9 0.7 1.9 2.1 145 1.6 
Sri Lanka LKA 4.9 2.3 3.7 2.7 4.4 3.6 4.6 3.6 4.1 3.8 88 1.6 
Sudan SDN 4.7 9.0 7.4 4.8 7.9 6.6 6.7 7.3 7.0 7.0 8 3.9 
Suriname SUR 3.5 0.1 2.0 2.8 0.8 1.9 5.9 3.8 4.9 2.7 126 2.3 
Swaziland SWZ 2.0 1.8 1.9 4.5 3.3 3.9 5.2 5.8 5.5 3.4 100 2.8 
Sweden SWE 1.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 4.4 2.7 1.9 0.9 1.4 1.3 179 1.9 
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Switzerland CHE 1.9 0.1 1.0 0.4 3.6 2.1 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.2 182 1.9 
Syria SYR 5.1 10.0 8.5 5.3 7.9 6.8 6.4 4.6 5.6 6.9 10 6.5 
Tajikistan TJK 6.1 5.7 5.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 5.8 4.1 5.0 4.4 62 2.3 
Tanzania TZA 4.6 5.3 5.0 5.3 5.8 5.6 5.1 7.5 6.5 5.7 26 1.4 
Thailand THA 6.4 4.3 5.4 2.1 3.8 3.0 5.0 2.9 4.0 4.0 80 2.2 
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
MKD 3.6 1.8 2.7 2.4 1.5 2.0 4.6 2.4 3.6 2.7 126 2.5 
Timor-Leste TLS 3.6 0.2 2.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 6.8 7.2 7.0 4.2 69 4.2 
Togo TGO 1.6 2.2 1.9 5.1 4.0 4.6 8.2 7.6 7.9 4.1 74 1.2 
Tonga TON 2.2 0.1 1.2 5.8 0.9 3.7 5.5 3.6 4.6 2.7 126 4.0 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 2.3 0.2 1.3 2.0 1.3 1.7 4.9 1.8 3.5 2.0 153 3.3 
Tunisia TUN 4.5 4.3 4.4 2.1 0.7 1.4 6.1 3.3 4.9 3.1 108 2.3 
Turkey TUR 6.0 9.0 7.8 2.8 6.6 5.0 3.6 2.7 3.2 5.0 45 1.6 
Turkmenistan TKM 4.6 1.1 3.0 2.7 0.9 1.8 7.5 4.6 6.3 3.2 106 4.9 
Tuvalu TUV 2.6 1.0 1.8 7.3 3.7 5.8 6.9 4.3 5.8 3.9 83 5.5 
Uganda UGA 3.4 6.2 5.0 5.7 6.3 6.0 6.7 7.1 6.9 5.9 23 1.8 
Ukraine UKR 3.2 9.0 7.0 1.6 6.5 4.5 6.6 2.4 4.8 5.3 37 1.9 
United Arab Emirates ARE 6.0 0.0 3.6 1.7 0.7 1.2 2.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 153 2.9 
United Kingdom GBR 2.1 2.4 2.3 0.9 3.3 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.5 2.0 153 1.8 
United States of America USA 6.9 4.3 5.8 1.2 3.3 2.3 2.7 1.6 2.2 3.1 108 2.5 
Uruguay URY 1.3 0.0 0.7 2.4 1.1 1.8 3.7 1.8 2.8 1.5 174 1.9 
Uzbekistan UZB 6.1 5.0 5.6 1.9 0.7 1.3 4.9 3.3 4.1 3.1 108 5.1 
Vanuatu VUT 4.2 0.0 2.3 5.0 3.2 4.2 5.8 6.4 6.1 3.9 83 3.5 
Venezuela VEN 5.9 5.8 5.9 2.9 4.1 3.5 5.2 3.4 4.4 4.5 59 2.5 
Viet Nam VNM 7.2 2.8 5.4 2.6 0.9 1.8 5.1 3.4 4.3 3.5 98 1.8 
Yemen YEM 3.7 10.0 8.2 5.1 8.2 6.9 8.3 7.3 7.8 7.6 6 3.3 
Zambia ZMB 2.4 1.8 2.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 4.8 7.1 6.1 4.1 74 2.3 
Zimbabwe ZWE 4.7 4.1 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.7 5.2 6.4 5.8 4.9 50 1.6 
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Somalia SOM 6.8 10.0 8.9 9.6 9.2 9.4 9.6 8.6 9.2 9.2 1 7.1 
South Sudan SSD 3.7 10.0 8.2 9.4 8.5 9.0 8.9 9.4 9.2 8.8 2 4.6 
Central African Republic CAF 1.7 10.0 7.9 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.2 9.1 8.7 8.4 3 4.0 
Afghanistan AFG 6.2 10.0 8.8 6.6 7.5 7.1 7.3 8.1 7.7 7.8 4 3.9 
Chad TCD 3.7 9.0 7.2 6.9 7.5 7.2 7.9 9.6 8.9 7.7 5 2.6 
Yemen YEM 3.7 10.0 8.2 5.1 8.2 6.9 8.3 7.3 7.8 7.6 6 3.3 
Niger NER 4.2 9.0 7.3 7.4 6.5 7.0 6.0 8.9 7.7 7.3 7 1.7 
Congo DR COD 3.3 8.0 6.2 6.3 7.6 7.0 7.8 8.1 8.0 7.0 8 2.3 
Sudan SDN 4.7 9.0 7.4 4.8 7.9 6.6 6.7 7.3 7.0 7.0 8 3.9 
Iraq IRQ 5.5 9.0 7.7 2.8 8.0 6.0 8.2 5.3 7.0 6.9 10 2.2 
Syria SYR 5.1 10.0 8.5 5.3 7.9 6.8 6.4 4.6 5.6 6.9 10 6.5 
Myanmar MMR 8.0 7.0 7.5 5.0 6.9 6.0 7.4 5.7 6.6 6.7 12 3.4 
Pakistan PAK 7.2 10.0 9.0 3.9 6.7 5.5 5.4 6.0 5.7 6.6 13 1.8 
Haiti HTI 5.6 5.2 5.4 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.7 7.3 7.5 6.5 14 1.9 
Ethiopia ETH 4.3 6.6 5.6 6.5 6.9 6.7 4.6 8.4 6.9 6.4 15 1.9 
Burundi BDI 3.0 8.0 6.1 6.9 5.8 6.4 6.1 6.7 6.4 6.3 16 3.9 
Nigeria NGA 2.8 9.0 6.9 4.2 6.6 5.5 5.1 7.7 6.6 6.3 16 2.6 
Cameroon CMR 2.3 9.0 6.8 4.9 6.5 5.8 4.8 6.9 6.0 6.2 18 2.7 
Kenya KEN 4.9 7.0 6.1 4.9 6.7 5.9 5.3 7.3 6.4 6.1 19 3.0 
Libya LBY 4.6 10.0 8.4 1.6 6.0 4.1 8.4 3.9 6.7 6.1 19 5.6 
Mali MLI 3.3 7.0 5.4 6.8 5.2 6.1 5.9 7.5 6.8 6.1 19 2.6 
Mozambique MOZ 5.9 4.6 5.3 7.0 4.7 6.0 4.4 8.2 6.7 6.0 22 2.3 
Uganda UGA 3.4 6.2 5.0 5.7 6.3 6.0 6.7 7.1 6.9 5.9 23 1.8 
Bangladesh BGD 8.3 6.5 7.5 3.7 5.6 4.7 5.0 5.9 5.5 5.8 24 1.3 
Papua New Guinea PNG 5.3 3.7 4.5 5.7 5.6 5.7 6.8 8.4 7.7 5.8 24 3.2 
Côte d'Ivoire CIV 2.0 6.0 4.3 5.5 5.8 5.7 7.3 7.6 7.5 5.7 26 1.8 
India IND 7.9 6.7 7.3 3.9 6.6 5.4 3.8 5.6 4.8 5.7 26 2.7 
Mauritania MRT 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.9 7.9 7.0 5.7 26 2.6 
Tanzania TZA 4.6 5.3 5.0 5.3 5.8 5.6 5.1 7.5 6.5 5.7 26 1.4 
Korea DPR PRK 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 8.8 3.4 6.9 5.6 30 4.0 
Guatemala GTM 6.9 4.8 6.0 4.4 5.4 4.9 6.2 5.2 5.7 5.5 31 1.8 
Burkina Faso BFA 2.8 5.3 4.2 7.3 4.9 6.2 4.7 7.4 6.2 5.4 32 2.4 
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Colombia COL 6.5 7.0 6.8 2.7 7.8 5.8 4.4 3.7 4.1 5.4 32 2.2 
Eritrea ERI 4.1 4.3 4.2 5.9 3.5 4.8 8.2 7.5 7.9 5.4 32 3.3 
Lebanon LBN 3.7 7.0 5.6 4.1 8.3 6.7 5.6 2.3 4.1 5.4 32 4.4 
Nepal NPL 5.5 5.0 5.3 4.1 5.9 5.1 6.2 5.5 5.9 5.4 32 1.7 
Congo COG 2.5 5.5 4.2 3.9 5.5 4.8 7.5 7.1 7.3 5.3 37 1.8 
Djibouti DJI 4.9 3.2 4.1 5.6 5.8 5.7 6.2 6.7 6.5 5.3 37 3.3 
El Salvador SLV 6.1 7.0 6.6 3.7 6.2 5.1 5.4 3.4 4.5 5.3 37 2.8 
Rwanda RWA 3.2 6.2 4.9 6.5 5.5 6.0 3.9 6.2 5.2 5.3 37 1.9 
Ukraine UKR 3.2 9.0 7.0 1.6 6.5 4.5 6.6 2.4 4.8 5.3 37 1.9 
Sierra Leone SLE 2.3 4.6 3.5 7.4 3.3 5.7 5.4 8.5 7.2 5.2 42 1.7 
Liberia LBR 3.0 2.2 2.6 7.7 4.6 6.4 7.0 8.6 7.9 5.1 43 2.8 
Senegal SEN 4.3 4.6 4.5 5.5 3.9 4.8 5.2 6.7 6.0 5.1 43 0.9 
Guinea GIN 2.4 4.2 3.4 5.7 3.8 4.8 6.3 8.4 7.5 5.0 45 1.9 
Iran IRN 7.2 5.3 6.3 2.7 5.5 4.2 5.5 3.7 4.7 5.0 45 2.5 
Madagascar MDG 5.9 1.4 4.0 5.3 2.7 4.1 6.1 8.6 7.6 5.0 45 3.2 
Solomon Islands SLB 5.5 0.8 3.5 7.2 1.9 5.1 6.9 6.8 6.9 5.0 45 4.6 
Turkey TUR 6.0 9.0 7.8 2.8 6.6 5.0 3.6 2.7 3.2 5.0 45 1.6 
Angola AGO 2.1 5.4 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.4 6.6 7.4 7.0 4.9 50 3.6 
Honduras HND 5.8 3.9 4.9 4.0 5.2 4.6 6.0 4.3 5.2 4.9 50 1.3 
Philippines PHL 8.4 9.0 8.7 2.6 4.1 3.4 4.6 3.6 4.1 4.9 50 2.0 
Zimbabwe ZWE 4.7 4.1 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.7 5.2 6.4 5.8 4.9 50 1.6 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 2.4 2.2 2.3 7.2 4.5 6.0 8.0 7.6 7.8 4.8 54 2.6 
Malawi MWI 3.7 1.5 2.7 6.8 5.7 6.3 5.4 7.2 6.4 4.8 54 1.9 
Mexico MEX 7.0 9.0 8.2 2.2 3.9 3.1 5.4 3.3 4.4 4.8 54 1.4 
Palestine PSE 3.2 4.4 3.8 4.3 7.7 6.3 6.0 2.7 4.6 4.8 54 3.8 
Azerbaijan AZE 4.5 5.5 5.0 1.4 6.5 4.4 6.4 2.6 4.8 4.7 58 2.6 
Cambodia KHM 5.4 4.2 4.8 4.1 1.7 3.0 7.0 6.0 6.5 4.5 59 2.2 
Egypt EGY 5.5 7.0 6.3 2.5 4.1 3.3 5.4 3.5 4.5 4.5 59 1.8 
Venezuela VEN 5.9 5.8 5.9 2.9 4.1 3.5 5.2 3.4 4.4 4.5 59 2.5 
Algeria DZA 4.1 6.7 5.5 3.1 3.4 3.3 4.9 4.6 4.8 4.4 62 2.6 
Benin BEN 1.5 3.9 2.8 5.8 2.0 4.2 5.9 7.8 7.0 4.4 62 1.8 
Russian Federation RUS 6.3 5.7 6.0 2.1 4.1 3.2 6.2 2.2 4.5 4.4 62 2.8 
Tajikistan TJK 6.1 5.7 5.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 5.8 4.1 5.0 4.4 62 2.3 
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Indonesia IDN 7.8 6.6 7.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 4.5 5.1 4.8 4.3 66 1.3 
Lao PDR LAO 4.7 2.9 3.9 4.2 2.0 3.2 6.4 6.0 6.2 4.3 66 1.7 
South Africa ZAF 4.4 4.6 4.5 3.3 4.7 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.3 66 1.5 
Ecuador ECU 6.8 1.9 4.8 2.4 4.5 3.5 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.2 69 0.7 
Lesotho LSO 1.9 2.4 2.2 5.5 4.9 5.2 7.1 6.2 6.7 4.2 69 2.0 
Nicaragua NIC 6.6 3.1 5.1 3.6 1.5 2.6 5.9 4.8 5.4 4.2 69 2.5 
Serbia SRB 4.6 4.8 4.7 1.6 5.9 4.1 5.2 2.3 3.9 4.2 69 1.7 
Timor-Leste TLS 3.6 0.2 2.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 6.8 7.2 7.0 4.2 69 4.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 4.2 3.4 3.8 2.3 5.3 4.0 6.1 2.4 4.5 4.1 74 2.5 
China CHN 7.9 5.5 6.9 1.8 3.6 2.7 3.9 3.5 3.7 4.1 74 2.3 
Jordan JOR 3.9 1.5 2.8 3.8 7.7 6.1 5.4 2.6 4.1 4.1 74 2.3 
Peru PER 7.0 2.5 5.2 2.3 3.3 2.8 4.8 4.3 4.6 4.1 74 1.0 
Togo TGO 1.6 2.2 1.9 5.1 4.0 4.6 8.2 7.6 7.9 4.1 74 1.2 
Zambia ZMB 2.4 1.8 2.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 4.8 7.1 6.1 4.1 74 2.3 
Bolivia BOL 3.8 5.4 4.6 3.4 1.7 2.6 6.0 4.8 5.4 4.0 80 2.2 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 1.5 4.5 3.1 3.8 1.9 2.9 8.0 6.3 7.2 4.0 80 3.2 
Thailand THA 6.4 4.3 5.4 2.1 3.8 3.0 5.0 2.9 4.0 4.0 80 2.2 
Gabon GAB 1.9 5.0 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.8 6.6 5.4 6.0 3.9 83 1.8 
Georgia GEO 4.5 2.8 3.7 2.9 5.9 4.6 4.6 2.0 3.4 3.9 83 2.4 
Morocco MAR 4.9 4.1 4.5 3.3 1.9 2.6 5.8 4.1 5.0 3.9 83 2.8 
Tuvalu TUV 2.6 1.0 1.8 7.3 3.7 5.8 6.9 4.3 5.8 3.9 83 5.5 
Vanuatu VUT 4.2 0.0 2.3 5.0 3.2 4.2 5.8 6.4 6.1 3.9 83 3.5 
Marshall Islands MHL 2.1 1.1 1.6 7.3 2.0 5.2 7.7 5.2 6.6 3.8 88 5.3 
Mongolia MNG 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.6 3.6 3.1 5.6 4.5 5.1 3.8 88 2.0 
Sri Lanka LKA 4.9 2.3 3.7 2.7 4.4 3.6 4.6 3.6 4.1 3.8 88 1.6 
Armenia ARM 4.4 2.4 3.5 2.1 3.7 2.9 6.7 2.4 4.9 3.7 91 2.1 
Comoros COM 2.6 0.6 1.7 5.8 2.6 4.4 7.9 5.8 7.0 3.7 91 4.1 
Micronesia FSM 3.0 0.1 1.7 6.5 3.9 5.3 6.0 5.3 5.7 3.7 91 4.5 
Namibia NAM 4.1 0.4 2.4 4.5 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.9 5.3 3.7 91 2.7 
Gambia GMB 2.2 1.1 1.7 6.3 3.5 5.1 4.9 6.0 5.5 3.6 95 1.9 
Ghana GHA 2.4 2.6 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 4.4 6.1 5.3 3.6 95 2.1 
Kiribati KIR 3.0 0.1 1.7 6.1 2.7 4.6 6.2 5.8 6.0 3.6 95 4.3 
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 5.9 3.2 4.7 3.0 1.0 2.1 5.4 3.4 4.5 3.5 98 1.6 
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Viet Nam VNM 7.2 2.8 5.4 2.6 0.9 1.8 5.1 3.4 4.3 3.5 98 1.8 
Brazil BRA 3.7 5.5 4.7 2.5 1.6 2.1 5.1 3.0 4.1 3.4 100 1.7 
Dominican Republic DOM 5.7 2.6 4.3 2.6 1.3 2.0 5.5 3.6 4.6 3.4 100 0.6 
Guyana GUY 3.1 0.4 1.8 4.2 3.6 3.9 6.3 4.6 5.5 3.4 100 2.6 
Malaysia MYS 4.8 3.6 4.2 2.3 3.7 3.0 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.4 100 3.1 
Swaziland SWZ 2.0 1.8 1.9 4.5 3.3 3.9 5.2 5.8 5.5 3.4 100 2.8 
Belize BLZ 5.2 0.1 3.0 3.0 1.5 2.3 6.3 4.0 5.3 3.3 105 2.4 
Panama PAN 4.9 0.1 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.8 3.3 4.1 3.2 106 1.9 
Turkmenistan TKM 4.6 1.1 3.0 2.7 0.9 1.8 7.5 4.6 6.3 3.2 106 4.9 
Fiji FJI 3.8 0.8 2.4 3.7 3.3 3.5 2.9 4.4 3.7 3.1 108 3.2 
Saudi Arabia SAU 2.6 10.0 8.0 1.8 0.4 1.1 4.7 2.1 3.5 3.1 108 3.5 
Tunisia TUN 4.5 4.3 4.4 2.1 0.7 1.4 6.1 3.3 4.9 3.1 108 2.3 
United States of America USA 6.9 4.3 5.8 1.2 3.3 2.3 2.7 1.6 2.2 3.1 108 2.5 
Uzbekistan UZB 6.1 5.0 5.6 1.9 0.7 1.3 4.9 3.3 4.1 3.1 108 5.1 
Dominica DMA 3.6 0.0 2.0 4.1 3.2 3.7 4.6 2.9 3.8 3.0 113 5.6 
Bhutan BTN 3.2 0.1 1.8 4.2 1.2 2.8 4.3 5.1 4.7 2.9 114 2.1 
Botswana BWA 2.7 0.1 1.5 4.1 2.9 3.5 4.9 4.6 4.8 2.9 114 2.0 
Chile CHL 6.6 1.3 4.5 2.3 1.5 1.9 3.1 2.6 2.9 2.9 114 1.8 
Costa Rica CRI 6.3 0.1 3.8 2.8 1.7 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9 114 1.8 
Palau PLW 3.1 0.1 1.7 4.5 0.8 2.9 6.1 3.4 4.9 2.9 114 5.0 
Paraguay PRY 1.9 2.5 2.2 3.7 0.9 2.4 5.4 3.6 4.6 2.9 114 1.6 
Albania ALB 5.8 0.1 3.5 2.0 0.7 1.4 5.8 2.7 4.4 2.8 120 2.2 
Cyprus CYP 3.0 0.6 1.9 1.3 6.6 4.5 3.3 1.6 2.5 2.8 120 2.3 
Israel ISR 4.3 4.5 4.4 1.2 2.9 2.1 3.3 1.1 2.3 2.8 120 2.5 
Nauru NRU 1.4 0.2 0.8 5.6 3.1 4.5 7.2 4.3 5.9 2.8 120 6.4 
Oman OMN 6.2 0.4 3.9 2.1 0.9 1.5 5.0 2.6 3.9 2.8 120 2.2 
Samoa WSM 2.7 0.1 1.5 5.5 0.4 3.4 4.6 3.6 4.1 2.8 120 3.3 
Greece GRC 4.7 2.9 3.9 1.5 2.8 2.2 3.6 1.0 2.4 2.7 126 2.1 
Moldova Republic of MDA 3.9 0.4 2.3 2.5 1.3 1.9 6.3 2.5 4.7 2.7 126 1.8 
Suriname SUR 3.5 0.1 2.0 2.8 0.8 1.9 5.9 3.8 4.9 2.7 126 2.3 
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
MKD 3.6 1.8 2.7 2.4 1.5 2.0 4.6 2.4 3.6 2.7 126 2.5 
Tonga TON 2.2 0.1 1.2 5.8 0.9 3.7 5.5 3.6 4.6 2.7 126 4.0 
Bulgaria BGR 3.4 1.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.3 4.3 1.7 3.1 2.6 131 2.8 
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Cuba CUB 5.6 1.1 3.7 2.7 0.2 1.5 3.9 2.2 3.1 2.6 131 3.0 
Italy ITA 5.0 1.3 3.4 1.0 3.3 2.2 3.7 0.9 2.4 2.6 131 1.7 
Romania ROU 4.7 1.5 3.3 1.8 1.3 1.6 4.6 2.3 3.5 2.6 131 1.9 
Argentina ARG 3.5 2.4 3.0 1.6 1.1 1.4 5.0 2.2 3.7 2.5 135 3.3 
Cabo Verde CPV 1.9 0.1 1.0 6.1 1.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.1 2.5 135 2.0 
Canada CAN 4.9 0.6 3.0 0.8 3.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 135 2.9 
Jamaica JAM 3.7 1.1 2.5 2.5 0.9 1.7 4.3 3.5 3.9 2.5 135 3.1 
France FRA 3.8 1.5 2.7 0.9 3.9 2.5 2.8 1.1 2.0 2.4 139 1.9 
Montenegro MNE 4.0 0.2 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 4.6 2.0 3.4 2.4 139 2.4 
Australia AUS 6.0 0.1 3.6 0.6 2.6 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.3 141 2.9 
Croatia HRV 5.0 0.7 3.1 1.5 0.9 1.2 4.4 1.4 3.0 2.2 142 2.2 
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 1.7 0.0 0.9 5.3 0.5 3.3 4.6 2.3 3.5 2.2 142 4.4 
Seychelles SYC 2.5 0.0 1.3 3.3 0.9 2.2 4.4 2.6 3.6 2.2 142 3.9 
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 2.7 0.6 1.7 1.8 0.9 1.4 5.3 2.0 3.8 2.1 145 4.2 
Bahamas BHS 3.6 0.0 2.0 2.3 0.9 1.6 3.3 2.5 2.9 2.1 145 3.2 
Belgium BEL 1.6 5.1 3.5 0.6 2.7 1.7 2.3 0.7 1.5 2.1 145 2.2 
Hungary HUN 3.6 1.8 2.7 1.5 1.7 1.6 2.9 1.1 2.0 2.1 145 1.9 
Kazakhstan KAZ 4.3 1.5 3.0 1.2 0.4 0.8 5.0 2.4 3.8 2.1 145 2.7 
Maldives MDV 3.1 0.1 1.7 2.1 0.7 1.4 5.8 1.5 4.0 2.1 145 4.3 
Mauritius MUS 3.4 0.1 1.9 2.9 0.6 1.8 3.5 2.0 2.8 2.1 145 1.6 
Spain ESP 4.5 2.8 3.7 1.1 1.4 1.3 2.9 0.7 1.9 2.1 145 1.6 
Belarus BLR 2.3 2.0 2.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 4.6 1.4 3.2 2.0 153 3.3 
Japan JPN 8.3 0.6 5.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 153 3.3 
Kuwait KWT 2.3 0.4 1.4 2.4 0.9 1.7 5.2 1.4 3.5 2.0 153 2.0 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 2.3 0.2 1.3 2.0 1.3 1.7 4.9 1.8 3.5 2.0 153 3.3 
United Arab Emirates ARE 6.0 0.0 3.6 1.7 0.7 1.2 2.3 1.5 1.9 2.0 153 2.9 
United Kingdom GBR 2.1 2.4 2.3 0.9 3.3 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.5 2.0 153 1.8 
Poland POL 2.4 0.4 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.6 4.0 1.3 2.8 1.9 159 1.6 
Qatar QAT 1.0 2.9 2.0 2.5 0.7 1.6 3.9 0.4 2.3 1.9 159 2.7 
Bahrain BHR 0.1 2.5 1.4 1.8 0.9 1.4 4.1 1.2 2.8 1.8 161 3.3 
Malta MLT 2.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 2.8 2.2 3.7 0.8 2.4 1.8 161 2.4 
New Zealand NZL 5.2 0.0 3.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 161 3.1 
Austria AUT 2.4 0.0 1.3 0.8 3.5 2.3 2.1 1.0 1.6 1.7 164 2.1 
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Brunei Darussalam BRN 2.3 0.1 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.8 4.7 4.2 4.5 1.7 164 4.1 
Latvia LVA 2.3 0.2 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.3 3.8 1.6 2.8 1.7 164 2.3 
Saint Lucia LCA 1.8 0.3 1.1 1.9 0.5 1.2 4.6 2.7 3.7 1.7 164 3.4 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
VCT 1.0 0.6 0.8 2.7 0.6 1.7 4.1 3.0 3.6 1.7 164 3.6 
Slovakia SVK 3.4 0.1 1.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 3.8 1.1 2.6 1.7 164 1.8 
Barbados BRB 2.5 0.0 1.3 1.9 0.5 1.2 2.7 2.1 2.4 1.6 170 2.7 
Germany DEU 2.2 0.1 1.2 0.5 4.0 2.4 2.2 0.7 1.5 1.6 170 2.8 
Korea Republic of KOR 5.2 1.8 3.7 0.8 0.4 0.6 2.5 1.3 1.9 1.6 170 2.8 
Portugal PRT 3.6 0.0 2.0 1.5 0.7 1.1 3.0 0.9 2.0 1.6 170 2.1 
Uruguay URY 1.3 0.0 0.7 2.4 1.1 1.8 3.7 1.8 2.8 1.5 174 1.9 
Czech Republic CZE 2.1 0.1 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.1 3.1 1.0 2.1 1.4 175 2.0 
Lithuania LTU 1.8 0.0 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.2 3.5 1.1 2.4 1.4 175 2.3 
Netherlands NLD 1.9 0.0 1.0 0.4 3.5 2.1 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 175 2.2 
Slovenia SVN 3.8 0.0 2.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 2.2 1.2 1.7 1.4 175 1.7 
Grenada GRD 0.5 0.1 0.3 3.1 0.5 1.9 5.0 2.4 3.8 1.3 179 3.7 
Ireland IRL 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.2 2.2 1.3 1.8 1.3 179 1.9 
Sweden SWE 1.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 4.4 2.7 1.9 0.9 1.4 1.3 179 1.9 
Sao Tome and Principe STP 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.8 1.4 3.3 6.3 4.7 5.6 1.2 182 3.3 
Switzerland CHE 1.9 0.1 1.0 0.4 3.6 2.1 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.2 182 1.9 
Denmark DNK 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 2.9 1.7 2.0 0.8 1.4 1.1 184 2.0 
Liechtenstein LIE 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.4 1.0 1.6 0.9 1.3 1.1 184 4.1 
Estonia EST 0.9 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.0 1.1 3.0 1.0 2.1 1.0 186 2.2 
Iceland ISL 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.0 186 2.6 
Norway NOR 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.5 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.6 0.7 188 1.8 
Finland FIN 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 2.3 1.5 1.6 0.9 1.3 0.6 189 2.2 
Luxembourg LUX 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.8 0.6 1.2 0.6 189 2.2 
Singapore SGP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.4 191 3.3 
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Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers  
to your questions about the European Union. 
 
Freephone number (*): 
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may 
charge you). 
 
More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa.eu). 
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 
Free publications: 
• one copy: 
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 
• more than one copy or posters/maps: 
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or 
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 
 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). 
Priced publications: 
• via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). 
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